| With the rapid development of Internet technology,the Internet has been applied to various industries,the network car is a combination of the Internet and the traditional taxi industry,the network car industry in large-scale development in 2015,the Ministry of transport in July 28,2016,announced the "on deepening reform to promote the healthy development of the taxi industry guidance" and "network reservation taxi management service management Interim Measures",which means the government formally recognized the legal status of network cars,but the specific regulatory rules did not clearly point out,only by the local government to play their own initiative,combined with local advantages,independent decision-making,the local government in the early 2017 basically launched a network of vehicle regulation rules,such as Beijing,Shanghai and other places require the network car drivers have local household registration and local license,the performance of the vehicle also has detailed requirements,,but too strict regulatory requirements,also makes the network car drivers miserable,network car platform has no incentive to actively monitor the implementation of government regulatory requirements.Therefore,the supervision of network vehicle is still the focus of attention.It is necessary to strengthen the supervision of the network platform,because it involves the convenience of the people travel and the development of the taxi and other industries,It is very urgent to handle the problem of "taxi difficult".In this paper,the principal-agent model is used to analyze the government's regulation of the network car.The principal-agent model is the earliest application in agriculture.With the development of the model,it is applied to the investment,management and many other areas,but the research on the network car regulation is also rarely involved.Because the government does not know enough about the information about the network car.and the network car platform in this area has an absolute advantage,so the government should cooperate with the network car platform,the government supervises the network car platform,the car platform management the vehicles and drivers,namely "government&enterprise" mode of supervision.On the basis of previous studies and referring to the experience of foreign countries about car supervision,this paper holds that the government should adopt a"government&enterprise" regulatory model,in order to study the feasibility of this model,build the principal-agent model between the network platform and the government,at the same time,innovative to join the taxi company competitors.Finally,a principal-agent relationship with a single client-double agents and a competitive relationship between the agents is formed.In the condition of symmetric and asymmetric information respectively to analyze the model,and compare the differences between the symmetric information and asymmetric information,finally using the government information interaction platform established by the Changsha government as an example analysis the principal-agent model between the government and the network car platform.The conclusions of this paper is:under the condition of symmetric information,the government can observe the efforts of the car network platform and taxi company,so the Pareto optimality can be reached,at this point,the expected revenue of the government is related to the economic benefits of the network platform and the efforts of the taxi company and the cost of effort,among them,there is a positive correlation between the square of economic efficiency and negative correlation between effort cost and effort cost..It shows that in the ideal case,the network platform and the taxi company will improve the service level and provide more convenient services for the public travel.The overall social welfare level of the whole society will increase.Under the condition of asymmetric information,the government can not observe the extent of the efforts of the network platform and taxi companies,and the network vehicle platform may use its own information advantages to seek greater interests for themselves,in such conditions,the expected return of the government is inversely proportional to the degree of agent's risk aversion,the cost of effort and the uncertainty of the outside world,this shows that the government can make use of the competition relationship between the car platform and the taxi company,guide the two parties to compete in a healthy way,improve the service quality,and finally make the whole society profit.Through the comparison between the information symmetry and the information asymmetry,it is concluded that when the information is asymmetric,the government needs to pay a certain price for its information inferiority,which is called the agency cost,the agency cost is proportional to the economic benefits of the taxi company's efforts,it is inversely proportional to the cost of the effort and the degree of competition between the car platform and the taxi company.Finally,the paper puts forward the following policy recommendations to the government:appropriate to reduce the threshold of the network cars,in turn to strengthen safety requirements;encourage the development of the network about cars,give the net adequate space for the development of cars;promoting the reform of taxi industry and enhancing the competitive power of taxi industry.Whether the network about cars or the traditional industry in the taxi,before being out of the market,should promote the reform and development,especially to the competition between the two,to promote the vigorous development of the taxi market.The principal-agent model is the innovation of this paper,but also there are many deficiencies in the model in order to simplify the model and set the parameter about net car platform with the taxi company of the same,assuming that the two have the same external conditions,but the actual situation is far more complicated than that and there is still a long way to go before we can solve the problem of network car platform supervision. |
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