The Study Of Evolution Of Cooperative Behavior

In the real society,people often face various social dilemmas in the aspects of society,economy,science,technology and military such as regional conflicts,network attacks,scientific and technological competitions,group confrontations and so on.These problems have brought a lot of confusion and helplessness to people's life,due to its difficult to find a reasonable and effective solution.However,practical experience shows that individuals can solve these problems through mutual cooperation.Therefore,the key to solving the dilemma is how to maintain a stable group cooperative behavior in the fierce competitive environment.It has caused domestic and foreign scholars to think about this issue from different fields of natural science.Fruitfully,biologists and economists explore the evolution of group cooperative behavior from human's economic behavior and decision-making behavior,and physicists explore it from the perspective of game theory based on nonlinear dynamics.Based on the aforementioned,we explore the cooperative behavior of group from two aspects.First of all,on the basis of the new measures of dilemma strength put forward by Wang Zhen et al.,we design the behavior experiment of dilemma strength,and recruit undergraduates to participate in the repetitive prisoner's dilemma game.The results show that the cooperative behavior of the group is related to the dilemma strength,and the smaller the dilemma strength,the stronger the cooperative behavior,and vice versa.If the dilemma strength is the same,the cooperative behavior of the group will remain at the same level.Players show a great emotional,that is,whether the player's cooperation in the current round will depend greatly on whether theopponent's cooperation in the previous round.In addition,tit-for-tat strategy is a simple and clear way of thinking,but it could effectively encourage players to achieve long-term cooperation.Furthermore,through clustering analysis,it was concluded that the players' behavior mode in the experiment of dilemma strength mainly include cooperation,TFT strategy(two cases)and defection.Secondly,based on the voluntary prisoner's dilemma game model,this paper studies the influence of different updating mechanisms on cooperative behavior of structural population.On the one hand,we pay attention to the Loners' participation willingness and find that for traditional case,three strategic types of players lead to a rock-scissor-paper dynamic with cyclic dominance,which makes the cooperative behavior sustainable.In particular,the system achieves the best state of full cooperation when Loners' participation willingness is appropriate.On the other hand,taking into account the prevalence of inertia in real life,we introduce it into the game mechanism and find that the greater inertia inhibits the cooperative behavior of the group.