Evolutionary Game Model Of Prisoner's Dilemma Under The Condition Of Kin Selection And Indirect Reciprocity

Game theorists have been studying social problems through the introduction of biological evolutionary game theory since the 1990 s,in which not only the equilibrium concept of game theory are reexamined in the sight of survival of the fittest,but the hypothesis of complete rationality is also relaxed,so as to provide various theoretical basis for Nash equilibrium and the choice of equilibrium.However,the basic problem of society is about coordination and cooperation,especially cooperation problem,which is considered as the significant symbol of social progress.As to prisoner's dilemma,being a major issue facing the whole world,evolutionary game offers it a new explanation.Among the five kinds of evolutionary cooperation mechanisms,kin selection and indirect reciprocity are the most crucial ones.In this thesis,through analyzing and studying the evolutionary game model of prisoner's dilemma under the condition of these two cooperation mechanisms,I achieve the corresponding evolutionary stable strategies and their establishment conditions,proving the stable appearance of cooperation forms with certain enlightenment.The main content of this thesis is as follows:(1)Based on the evolutionary game model of prisoner's dilemma under the condition of kin selection,I obtain the relevant evolutionary stable strategies,analyze the dynamic evolution process of evolutionary stable strategies and discuss the effect of kin relationships on evolutionary stable strategies,giving a new interpretation on how to transfer to cooperation from betrayal and keep the stability of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma under the condition of kin selection.(2)On the basis of the evolutionary game model of prisoner's dilemma under the condition of indirect reciprocity,I utilize the related knowledge about evolutionary stable strategies and replicator dynamic to solve corresponding evolutionary stable strategies and analyze their evolutionary paths,discuss the impact of evolutionary stable strategies from reputation probabilities and illustrate the requirements of the cooperation of both players in prisoner's dilemma.(3)On the strength of the two cooperation,kin selection and indirect reciprocity,I set up the game model of prisoner's dilemma,apply the associative theoretical knowledge of evolutionary game to analyze the stability of strategies and solve the related evolutionary stable strategies and discuss the evolutionary process and related transformation ofevolutionary stable strategies under the influence of kin relationships and reputation probabilities,simultaneously,I also give a demonstration that the two kinds of evolutionary games of prisoner's dilemma in the cases of kin selection and indirect reciprocity are the two particular examples.