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Research On Transaction Mechanism Of China Used Car Market Based On Asymmetric Information

Posted on:2019-05-27Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y W ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330542954702Subject:Applied Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the beginning of the 21st century,domestic automotive sales volume has maintained a high growth rate.At the end of 2016,the number of civil vehicles in China reached 185.74 million,and the number of cars per 100 households reached 22.The prosperity of the new car market has laid a foundation for the development of the used car market.However,the used car market in the country is still in its infancy.The buying and selling mechanism of the used car market is not perfect,and the information network and after-sales service are lagging behind the developed countries.The lack of a domestic used car market mechanism has resulted in serious asymmetric information in the used car market,which has undermined purchaser confidence and hindered the healthy development of the used car market.Therefore,it is of great significance to study and resolve asymmetric information in the China used car market.This paper firstly reviews the asymmetric information theory,game theory and rent-seeking theory used in the used car market.After introducing the basic theory,the development status of foreign and domestic used car markets was compared and analyzed,and several major characteristics of domestic used car development were summarized.When analyzing the asymmetric information between the parties of the used car market,the paper makes the game analysis of buyers,sellers and assessment agencies,and comes to a conclusion that buyers have information disadvantage with respect to the seller and the possibility of collusion between the seller and the assessment agency.Therefore,I suggest that the buyer entrusts the insurance company to new game with sellers and assessment agencies as a third-party monitoring force.After conducting a tripartite game analysis of insurance companies,sellers and assessment agencies,I find out that the probability of rent-seeking is associated with insurance companies'supervision effectiveness,supervision costs,and the severity of penalties imposed on sellers and evaluation agencies.At the same time,this paper compares the foreign and domestic used car market trading mechanism.Combined with the development of the second-hand car market in Germany,I try to provide reference for China to solve the development bottleneck of the used car market.Through game analysis and research on advanced foreign transaction mechanism,this paper puts forward proposals for improving the used car market transaction system and the used car market credit system.In terms of trading system,governments actively improve the evaluation criteria of used cars,issue unified and authoritative assessment methods;Continuously strengthened the construction of second-hand car circulation system,promoted the exchange of market information among different regions,and provided a basis for the rational allocation of used car resources;In view of the serious information asymmetry in the market,the governments should establish information disclosure systems to improve the disclosure system of used car information.The governments also strengthen the management of used car dealers'business operations,and promptly disclose unqualified dealers and punish them.In the market credit system,the government authorized the insurance company to build a credit management platform to record the honest behavior of the dealers and provide suggestions for consumers'purchase decisions.
Keywords/Search Tags:Used Car Market, Information Asymmetry, Game Analysis, Transaction Mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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