As the pillar introduction of china's economy, the real estate introduction has an important role on the healthy and stale development of national economy. At the same time, many problems emerged in the course of its development, the reason of that is not only from the macro-control but also from the investors and developers. From the point of view of the market, on the one hand, in order to maximize short-term and sectional interests, some real estate enterprises designedly disguise some important information of their commodities, which impinges consumers'interests and leads them to make converse choices; the worse thing is that they even conduct some "moral hazard" activities in their sales, which brings about the low efficiency of the real estate market. On the other hand, most of the consumers are not professional enough to know the quality of the property fully, which have led to the serious information asymmetry problems.Under the background,this thesis concentrates on the developers and consumers in the real estate markets as my research objects. By studying the game between property companies and consumers, the author has an analysis from price and quality and tries to get the mutual relationships of the two market objects under the situation of information asymmetry, the author tries to apply some completive models of game theory and disclose a new way to study the real estate market.The core of the paper is divided into two parts. The first part, the author applies the model of double auction by means of the game analyses between the developers and consumers in the real estate markets, obtains linear equilibrium strategy, and the author reaches that information asymmetry is the main reason which results in deal inefficiency of real estate market through analyzing; and studies static Bayesian game between the developers and consumers in the condition of information asymmetry, the author obtains that the different anticipates between developers and consumers because of information asymmetry which results in contradictions and non-harmonious of real estate market. The second part, by means of analyzing game between developers and consumers about quality, the author applies signaling mechanism to replying adverse selection of consumers before signing contracts and applies supervise mechanism to answer moral hazard of developers after signing contracts. From analyzing the game between the developers and consumers, through the backwards-induction this article compares the results of two models of a single consumer, a single developer with the third one considering the government's intervention, although deceived by the developer, the consumers can't maintenance their right without the protection of the government. Property developer wouldn't do honest business unless be punished severely. Through the analysis of the information asymmetry problems of China's real estate market, the author gives some advice to the government, developers and consumers to perfect the real estate market of China. |