Procurement Contract Design Based-on Advance Selling Under Asymmetric Information

With the intensification of market competition,taking a scientific and effective sales strategy plays a vital role for the long-term development of the enterprise.Advance selling is the most frequently used method to sell products by retailers,which helps the retailer forecast the demand information,expand the market and reduce inventory risk before the products entering the market.Meanwhile,business makers should perceive the asymmetric information when purchasing orders and take the responsibility to design a reasonable mechanism to avoid the conflicts of interest between both sides of supply chain.The purpose of this paper is to study the design of incentive mechanism for the retailer to procure under asymmetric information.The main contents studied in this paper are as follows:In Chapter 2,the retailer's optimal procurement contract design problem under asymmetric information is investigated,in which a retailer sell the product which is manufactured by the supplier to consumers through the terminal market.In the presence of the supplier's unobservable production cost and exogenous pre-sales price,two classes of procurement models are developed.The optimal contracts are obtained under above-mentioned circumstances.The results show that the optimal delivery time under asymmetric information is shorter than that under symmetric information,while the wholesale price under asymmetric information is higher than that under symmetric.Besides,the optimal wholesale price under asymmetric information increases with the supplier's production cost and consumer's waiting cost,and the optimal delivery time decreases with the supplier's production cost and consumers' waiting cost.Finally,a numerical example is applied to analyze sensitivity.In Chapter 3,the retailer's optimal procurement contract design problem,in which the advance price is based on the waiting-time,is discussed under the asymmetric information of the supplier's manufacturing cost.The retailer maximizes its expected profit by designing the contract.We establish the procurement contract model and derive the optimal solution through variational method.The results show that the optimal delivery time decreases with the supplier's production cost but increases with the difference between the advance selling timesensitive factor and waiting cost.Finally,a numerical is presented to analyze sensitivities of main parameters.