The Contract Design Of Production And Research Cooperation Under Information Asymmetry

With the development of globalization,the competition in current world becomes fiercer and fiercer,especially the science and technology,as the primary productivity,is the stress of competition.Technology can't create wealth unless the scientific and technological achievements can be transformed into actual productivity.As the main way of transformation of scientific and technical achievements,the development of production and research cooperation in developed country has been mature,which in our country is still immature.In order to promote the transferring rate of science and technology achievements,our country has put out a lot of efforts,but the rate is still very low,the main reason is that there are many serious problems need to solved.In this paper,we put forward three main problems: firstly,in the traditional way of production and research cooperation,people like to trade technology by cash;secondly,small and medium-sized enterprises often have no enough money to import technology;thirdly,there are different kinds of asymmetric information.According to the existing problems,we think that a technology holder can take part in production and research cooperation by getting technology equity and debt,rather than getting cash from co-operative enterprise.Besides that,a game model which analyzed the optimal contract design under asymmetric information has been built in this paper.In this study,a fixed technology price-setting contract with equity plus debt is designed by the principal-agent theory and mechanism design theory.The contract can distinguish the real information of enterprises,so it's better for the transformation of scientific and technical and ensure the technology holder's benefits.The research of this study has guiding value for promoting the development of industry-research institute collaboration and the industrial application of technologies.