Analysis Of Chinese Enterprises Curve Backdoor Listing Mode And Effects From The Perspective Of Supervision

Backdoor listing as a special way to enter the capital market,because of its advantages compared with IPO has low cost,short process and other advantages,once favored by all walks of life.However,with the rapid development of China's capital market and the continuous evolution of the backdoor listing,the backdoor listing has gradually emerged many problems such as insider trading and manipulation of stock prices,related transactions and corruption.In order to maintain the stability of China's capital market and maintain the healthy and orderly development of the capital market,China's securities regulatory authorities have taken a series of regulatory measures for backdoor listing.The regulatory standards of backdoor listing in 2011 was "convergence"with IPO,and then to 2013,The regulatory standards of backdoor listing changed to "equivalent",indicating that the securities regulatory authorities to backdoor listing behavior strict supervision of the determination.September 2016 revision of "listed companies significant asset restructuring management approach" is the backdoor listing of the regulatory standards to "the most stringent level" in history.However,in such a strict regulatory environment,there are still many cases of circumvention of the curve backdoor in China's capital market.In this paper,through the analysis of our current backdoor listing supervision system,found three kinds of feasible backdoor curve model,respectively control the transaction size,first transaction and then change the actual controller and the introduction of third party.After analyzing the characteristics and operation methods of the three curve back door modes,this paper selects the Nanyang Technology and Montemet Rongxin the two representative case analysis of the backdoor curve,the curve backdoor mode and the specific operating practices,and use the event study method to analyze the effects of the two cases in the capital market.In view of the Nanyang Technology curve backdoor case,this paper chooses to release the reorganization plan day and the CSRC through the reorganization plan day as the event day,taking the 20 days before and after the event as the window of the event,the paper finds that the curve backdoor model controlling the scale of the transaction has a positive impact on China's capital market.In view of the Monternet Rongxin curve backdoor case,this paper selects the two parties to sign the letter of commitment and the change promises of the two parties as the event day,the same as before,the event window is taken as the event 20 days before and after the event,found that the First transaction and then change the actual controller backdoor curve model has a negative impact on the capital market of our country.In addition,these two cases reflect the problems of excessive supervision and lack of supervision in China's current backdoor listing supervision system.Finally,based on the related research at home and abroad based on the binding mode and effect of China's enterprises backdoor curve,the suggestions on improving China's backdoor listing supervision system is put forward,including in the backdoor listing of the restructuring plan that increases the subjective motivation factors,improve the restructuring plan with the supervision system and guard against the three party transactions in the standard.