Research On The Incentive Effectiveness Of State-Owned Enterprise Managers Under Mixed Ownership Reform

In the 1980s,China opened the prelude to the reform and opening up.The reform of state-owned enterprises is accompanied by the continuous improvement of economic system reform,the degree of marketization is deepening,and the malpractice of state-owned enterprises is gradually appearing with the deepening of reform.Due to the multi-tiered agency relationship of SOEs from top to bottom,the state,the people and the market have many difficulties in supervising state-owned enterprises.In the process of the development of state-owned enterprises,In the process of the development of state-owned enterprises,the real problems such as the absence of owners,the inefficient operation of state-owned capital,the loss of state-owned capital,and the imperfect incentive and restraint mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers are all problems.The implementation of mixed ownership requires state-owned enterprises to introduce non-state capitals to promote diversification of property rights and to promote their establishment of a modern enterprise system in line with the market competition mechanism,which can solve the above-mentioned real problems that state-owned enterprises has faced to some extent.The external problem of the formation and development of mixed ownership enterprises is how to promote the further diversification of their property rights,but the underlying problem is how to establish the modern enterprise system,especially in different kinds of state-owned enterprises,how to improve the corporate governance structure based on the professional management system,and the issue of managers'incentives plays a central role in the corporate governance structure.It is important to improve the incentive mechanism of managers and improve the effect of incentives to attract high-quality professional managers,enhance the vitality of state-owned enterprises and improve the efficiency of corporate governance.This paper is mainly divided into five parts.The first part is the introduction,which mainly introduces the background of the thesis,the purpose and significance of the research,as well as the content arrangement and frame structure of the thesis,and also points out the innovation of this article.The second part is the theoretical basis and literature review.It mainly elaborates the relevant theories such as incentive theory and principal-agent theory,and systematically reviews the relevant literature.The third part is about the research on the incentive effectiveness of managers in mixed ownership reform state-owned enterprises,mainly discussing the relationship between manager's salary incentive,promotion incentive,equity incentive and company's performance and government's regulation in incentive effect,and According to the different types of state-owned enterprises,theoretical analysis is made respectively,and corresponding research hypotheses are proposed.The fourth part is the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of the incentive system of managers in state-owned enterprises.This part is mainly to collect data,design sample variables,construct empirical models,and explore salary incentives,promotion incentives and equity incentives of managers in different categories of state-owned enterprises and demonstrate the above research hypothesis.The fifth part is the conclusion of the research,the management enlightenment and the prospect of the research.This part mainly summarizes the conclusions drawn in this paper,provides some management enlightenment for the state-owned enterprises under the "mixed reform",and at the same time prospects the follow-up research.The fifth part is the conclusion,the management revelation and the research prospect.This part mainly summarizes and summarizes the conclusion of this paper,provides some management revelation for the state-owned enterprises under the background of "mixed reform",and also prospects the follow-up research.Based on the relevant policy documents and the research achievements of other scholars,this paper divides state-owned enterprises into competitive state-owned enterprises and public-welfare state-owned enterprises,and uses empirical research methods to analyze the effects and differences of managers' incentives in different types of state-owned enterprises and government control In the incentive effect of the regulatory role.The conclusions drawn from the study are as follows:The compensation incentive,promotion incentive and equity incentive of state-owned enterprise managers all play a significant role in promoting corporate performance.Compared with the public welfare state-owned enterprises,the incentive effectiveness of competitive state-owned enterprises is more significant,Government control has a significant negative regulatory role in the relationship between promotion incentive and performance of SOE managers,that is,government control weakens the incentive effect of manager promotion incentive.Based on the above theoretical analysis and empirical research results,this paper optimizes the incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers under the background of mixed ownership reform,trying hard to improve the external market environment,improve the internal governance mechanism,optimize the performance appraisal system,set up a wide range of incentives Structure,implement the long-term equity incentives,emphasize promotion incentives and other aspects,which is to build state-owned enterprise managers incentive mechanism to further enhance the effectiveness of state-owned enterprise managers incentive mechanism and promote the orderly development of state-owned enterprises.The research on the incentive mechanism of different types of state-owned enterprise managers in this paper enriches the related theory of"classified governance" of state-owned enterprises and further expands the research results of the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers under the background of mixed ownership reform,hoping to provide useful reference for optimizing the different categories SOE manager compensation incentive contract.