Executive Pay Gap?Power Allocation And Enterprise Continuous Competitiveness

Income distribution has become a hot spot in the society,and its fairness and motivation have always attracted public attention.The senior managers of listed companies in China are the important role of business decision-making and strategic development.Their salary level is not only the microcosmic embodiment of income distribution,but also the audience of social fairness and incentive mechanism.In recent years,China has been vigorously nurturing the development of enterprises,and regulatory documents relating to corporate governance have also been issued.Based on the theory of championship,the theory of power and the background of China's unique system,this article combines the research findings and research methods of previous scholars,and from the perspective of human capital,discusses deeply the influence mechanism of executive pay gap on the sustainable competitiveness of enterprises.Based on this research,the power allocation variable is added to analyze its regulatory effect.This paper divides the allocation of power into operating right allocation and ownership allocation.The power of managers as the allocation of management rights represents the negative result brought by power theory,and the nature of property rights as a classification of ownership configuration discusses the pay differential between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises.This paper uses the power of managers and the nature of property rights as a regulatory variable to explore its impact on the relationship between executive pay gaps and corporate sustainable competitiveness.In the framework of theoretical analysis,this paper establishes relevant models for each variable,performs multiple linear regression,and finally obtains related research results to test whether the hypothesis holds.This article is based on the data selection of all listed A-share companies from 2012 to 2015,and finally obtained 5004 research samples.After carrying out empirical research on the sample,the following results were obtained:(1)The executive compensation gap has a positive correlation with the sustainability of the company,and the tournament theory has been verified.(2)The enhancement of managerial power will weaken the positive impact of executive pay gaps on the sustainable competitiveness of enterprises.(3)When the company actually controls man-made government,the positive correlation between the executive compensation gap and the company's sustained competitiveness is suppressed.The research results of this article reasonably explain the existing principal-agent conflicts in the listed companies in China,and provide practical suggestions for the design of the enterprise compensation structure system.The conclusions drawn from this paper indicate on the one hand that not only should the manager's power be properly controlled,but also the supervision and examination should be strengthened to prevent the bad behavior of managers.On the other hand,research on state-owned enterprises with policy support has been limited.Because of its unique institutional background,the salary gap incentive system has been limited,so the company's championship incentive effect has been weakened.This article not only enriched the relevant theoretical system,but also improved the governance mechanism of listed companies in China to a certain extent,and proposed countermeasures to the problems that emerged.