Research On The Incentive And Supervision Mechanism Of Private Equity Fund Managers

Private equity fund has been developing for more than 30 years in China.With the increase of per capita income and the emergence of new investment idea,private placement has become an important part of investment and financing in China.Private equity fund problems in the development process are gradually exposed,in July 2017 the implementation of the "Securities and futures investors appropriate management measures" reflect a more normative requirements of financial private industry,the financial investment in the enterprise's internal control and protection of the interests of the shareholders of the requirements on the agenda.Because of the objective problems existing in China's capital market and the inherent problems of private placement and the dual principal-agent relationship between shareholders(owners),managers(managers)and customers(investors),supervision on private placement managers is difficult.This article from the perspective of shareholders,the current situation of China's private equity fund industry analysis,comparing China's private equity fund managers to have the corresponding incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism of the problems and the situation with the case,described the problems and shortcomings of the case company incentive and supervision mechanism,and then put forward the corresponding suggestions and measures to optimize,optimize and supplement to theory and practice.It is specifically divided into the following parts:Related theories and concepts of private equity funds and the first part is mainly about private equity funds,private equity funds and contact types,distinguish different,and to explain the mechanism of motivation and supervision from the internal control and financial management theory,principal-agent theory,contract theory and other related theory.The second part explains the current situation of China's private equity fund,and of China's private equity fund industry data and data are summarized,which analyze the private equity fund industry,and through the relevant industry data and status of private equity funds,the fund manager's existing management incentive and supervision mechanism are described and analysis.This is to reflect the industry background of the whole private equity fund and provide the basis for the analysis of the latter.The third part makes a detailed analysis of the industry data,and establishes the corresponding data model,which is used to analyze the equilibrium between the manager's income and the protection of shareholders' rights and interests,so as to get the optimal solution.The fourth part according to the above analysis,combined with relevant theoretical knowledge of case company status and related issues,while for the case company's problems put forward the reconstruction suggestions and optimization suggestions,in order to reflect the existing management improvement direction of industry of China Private Equity Fund company.This article is mainly from the perspective of shareholders to analyze the incentive and supervision of managers.Under the premise of maximizing the rights and interests of shareholders,we should improve the existing managerial mechanism of our country.This is also in line with the continuous development of private equity in China,and I hope this paper can make a valuable contribution to the previous literature.