Analysis Of Equity Incentive Plan And Implementation Effect Of L Garden Company

In modern enterprises,the interests of the owners and managers are inconsistent,and even the two sides are opposing positions.The equity incentive system is the best tool to solve the�consignment-agent� problem in the enterprise.It makes the interests of the two converge and facilitates the better operation of the company.The equity incentive system has been widely used in Western developed countries.In recent years,the equity incentive system has also gradually been recognized by the Chinese government and listed companies and implemented.With the formulation and improvement of relevant laws in China,such as the end of 2005,the "China Securities Regulatory Commission" promulgated the "Administrative Measures on the Equity Incentives of Listed Companies," and the "Company Law," and the "Securities Law," and other related laws.The listed company's equity incentives provided policy basis and operational guidelines,and equity incentives began to flourish in China.This paper conducts a case study on the equity incentive of L Garden Company.Taking China's "Measures for the Management of Listed Companies' Stock Incentives" as the standard and combining with other listed companies' equity incentive plans in the same industry to evaluate the L Garden Company's stock incentive plan;at the same time,the use of financial analysis and non-financial analysis methods to implement equity incentives The effect of quantitative and qualitative analysis.The research results suggest that the L Garden Company equity incentive plan is in compliance with the Regulations for the Stock Incentives of Listed Companies.Through the analysis of the implementation effect of equity incentives,it is concluded that the implementation of incentives will improve the company's operating performance,achieve the strategic goals,and the enthusiasm of employees and personnel.Stability has a positive effect,but there are also deficiencies in the equity incentive plan,such as high incentive costs,imperfect performance evaluation indicators,the impact of the exercise price on the exercise price and the failure to consider future changes in the external environment and other conditions This paper proposes corresponding countermeasures against these defects,such as improving the assessment system,establishing sliding rights indicators,and establishing flexible exercise prices.Finally,the paper concludes the full text and draws conclusions.