Research On The Formation Mechanism Of Standard Essential Patent Licensing Fees

The rapid rise of high-tech industries represented by knowledge-intensive industries provide a huge space for the integration of standards and patents.As a unified technical standard,the standard has shared attributes of public products.Patent,as a private right,has the property of private property.The integration of standards and patents is a process of mutual conflict and gradual harmonization between the public interests and private interests.In order to balance the private interests of the patentee and the public interests,the standard formulation organization has formulated the "fair,reasonable and non-discriminatory" principle in order to balance the interests.As a result of standard essential patents "fair,reasonable and non-discriminatory principle" principle is a loose promises,it is hard for the patentee and standard implementer agree on licensing fees through negotiation.The standard essential patent licensing fees dilemma has become academia and business topics.Combining with both the literature and judicial precedents,based on standard essential patents have double attributes,clarify the reason of license fee dilemma,analyse the formation mechanism of standard essential patent licensing fees.This not only helps to enrich the theoretical research of the standard essential patent license fee,but also provides enlightenment for the practice of standard essential patent licensing.This thesis will introduce the theory of economic function,and construct the negotiation model of the standard essential patent license fee through the game theory method.First,analyse the subject structure "black box" and the game model of the license fee when the standard essential patentee is the external innovator and the internal innovator in the "one to one" situation.Secondly,in the case of "one to many",the game model of the license fee when the standard essential patentee is the external innovator and the internal innovator.Based on the game model,through the research on "one to one" and "one to many" situation,when standard essential patent holder is external innovators,the patent holder does not participate in production activities,as long as a the standard essential patent license fee rate is lower than the cost reduction ratio,social production increase,increase consumer surplus.In "one to one" and "one to many" case,when the standard necessary to the patentee is internal innovators,as long as the license fee is less thanhalf of the cost reduction,social production increase,increase consumer surplus.In the case of "one-to-many",it is necessary for the patent holder not to discriminate the licensee and charge different license fee because of the cost difference between licensees.