The Research Of Patent Royalty Standard Based On The Standard Essential Patents

Antitrust enforcement of intellectual property is weak in the related department of antitrust enforcement.Allow the patent holders on the one hand, intellectual property law itself can be set in the duration of patent monopoly, and the price is to inspire the manufacturer’s r&d spending.On the other hand, the problems in the field of intellectual property rights are often complicated and specialized.How to balance between the two, make the patent holders that received due benefits, and will not result in a loss of social welfare at the same time.Build a "fair and reasonable without discrimination" licensing rates has been the focal place of the intellectual property antitrust.In February 2015, the national development and reform commission of the People’s Republic of China antitrust authorities ruled that qualcomm abuse in wireless standards necessary patent licensing market dominant position, the high price of patent licensing fees charged unfair.But how to judge whether the charge the unfair, there are still many problems need to be researched.For patent licensing fees standard question, namely FRAND requirement to the principle of quantitative problem, has been the focus of the scholars study.From Swanson and Baumol, puts forward the bidding model about competitive patent advance into the cooperative game about how income distribution of Shapley value method is applied to the complementary patent licensing fees standard the debate to Lemley and using Shapiro arbitration mechanism to solve disputes of patent licensing fees.Each method for patent licensing fees standard puts forward a new train of thought.But due to the complexity of intellectual property, each method has its specific applicable environment.In qualcomm case due to involving in the baseband chip maker upstream and downstream of gaming between smartphone makers.Patent licensing fees standard obviously is not simply a one-off game can determine.The above three methods cannot be directly applied qualcomm case.Qualcomm anti-trust case core lies in the standards patent license fees.On the one hand, qualcomm that hold a lot of standard and non-standard wireless patents, patent the licence fee shall be protected by intellectual property law.Upstream baseband chips, on the other hand, need to buy to the production of the domestic smartphone makers because without their own core technology, homogeneity competition, many vendors in the profit and loss balance or even losses.Based on this, this paper adopts two stage stark kohlberg price game model to explore the prices charged by the qualcomm is too high.In the actual situation, as the upstream supplier qualcomm has the ability to advance the price, this causes the game bid order has successively.Qualcomm contention is patent licensing fees standard, USES the upstream and downstream stark Kerr’s price game model has its rationality.So far we have not touch nature, namely, qualcomm case the problem of patent licensing fees.National development and reform commission Suggestions mentioned for qualcomm qualcomm decision in 3 g and 4 g technology licensing of mobile devices, the licensing fees charging standard for 3 g was 5%,4 g was 3.5%.But as the core of qualcomm 2 g technology (CDMA technology) standards have also dropped to 65% of equipment sales.On the one hand, reflected in qualcomm wireless standard essential patents market abuse of dominant market position.Patent licensing fees, on the other hand, the lower the also to a certain extent, ease the upstream chip suppliers and downstream handset makers in the patent licensing fees standard problem of the tension.By upstream and downstream stark kohlberg price game model to solve the equilibrium results, through what way to build a "fair and reasonable" without discrimination standard of patent licensing fees.In respectively analyzes the chip market upstream and downstream of the mobile phone market market structure after considering the standard essential patents "quasi public goods" attribute, and on the analysis of the commonly used means of government regulation, the two together, build a model in the second stage.We tried in the solution of upstream and downstream stark Kerr’s price game model, on the basis of price cap regulation model is set up to explore relative fair and reasonable patent licensing fees and the optimal wholesale price of chip.First it must be admitted in the patent licensing fees standard USES the price cap regulation on the question of whether is in order.Because the patent holder is to obtain the purpose of investment in research and development of patent monopoly, and the price is for a period.Price cap regulation model obviously violate the above principles.But on the other hand, the national development and reform commission to qualcomm’s judgment Suggestions also implied in the lower qualcomm yields the implicit information, as the national development and reform commission and qualcomm recognition judgment Suggestions inevitably has its rationality.On the other hand, as a standard of quasi-public goods attributes necessary patent also has the reason of government regulation.In addition, as there are no uniform consensus problem of patent licensing fees, different ideas may have some contribution for further future research.After reading, sorting, thought, modeling, calculation after the final result will be clear, but the level of the author is limited, the error is inevitable, but hope can explain the qualcomm case carries on the preliminary theory.