Research On The Competition Game Model Between Manufacturers And Remanufacturers | | Posted on:2018-01-19 | Degree:Master | Type:Thesis | | Country:China | Candidate:J Ye | Full Text:PDF | | GTID:2359330566456863 | Subject:Management Science and Engineering | | Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request | | In closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)with collection and remanufacturing of old products,how to deal with the competitive threat from the external remanufacturer is an important issue for the original equipment manufacturer(OEM).For a two-period CLSC system comprised of an OEM and an independent remanufacturer,two cases that whether the OEM opens the remanufacturing fields or not are considered and analyzed:(1)When the OEM only produces new products,the game strategies between the OEM and the remanufacturer under two types of competitive mode(competition with remanufacturing patent authorization and competition without remanufacturing authorization licensing)and cooperative mode are discussed.Backward deduction method is used to derive and compare the optimal prices and the optimal collection rate under the above three modes.The condition under which the remanufacturer engages in collection and remanufacturing is given.The impact of consumer preference for the remanufactured products on the equilibrium solutions and the profits of channel members are analyzed combined with numerical examples.The managerial insights are provided from the view of environmental performances,members’ profits and channel efficiency,respectively.(2)When the OEM engages in new products production and EOL(end-of-life)products remanufacturing simultaneously,it is assumed that the consumers’ willing-to-pay for the new products,the OEM’s remanufactured products and the remanuafcturer’s remanufactured products are differentiated.So price competition between the three products exists in the market.The game models between the OEM and the remanufacturer are built and the inverse demand functions are utilized to obtain the equilibrium production quantities and pricing policies.The comparison between this model and the benchmark model without the OEM’s remanufacturing are given.The research shows that whether the output of remanufactured products is constrained by the collected EOL products has significant influences on profit allocations.The conclusions can provide theoretical supports for the OEMS to cope with the competition from the external remanufacturer. | | Keywords/Search Tags: | original equipment manufacturer, remanufacturer, competition, cooperation, price discrimination | PDF Full Text Request | Related items |
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