Research On Incentive And Regulation Of Two Tenders Combined Into One Of Construction Enterprises Participating In PPP Projects Under Chinese Situation

PPP(Public Private Partnership)model was introduced in China in 1980 s.After different stages of development,the research and application of PPP model was pushed to the climax in 2014.Through the reform of four years,the PPP market of our country expands rapidly,the construction enterprises actively transform and join in the PPP market,become the most important social capital type in the PPP market.However,with the development of PPP projects,various kinds of nonstandard phenomena have been exposed gradually in practice,which is related to the construction enterprise is two tenders combined into one.It is an effective measure to encourage construction enterprises to participate in PPP projects,but because of unclear government regulation in the industry controversy,for the development of PPP projects buried hidden dangers.The principal-agent theory shows that when the principal is assigned to the agent,the incentive problem will appear.There are two basic factors that lead to incentive problem,that is,the inconsistency of objectives between the parties and the decentralization of information.In the principal-agent relationship of the PPP projects,the government has the responsibility to regulate the social capital f that provides public goods.Therefore,government should not only encourage social capital to participate actively and improve efficiency,but also restrict social capital to use information advantages to harm public interests.The incentive regulation theory regards the regulation problem as a principal-agent problem,focusing on how to design the incentive regulatory framework between the regulators and the regulated ones with asymmetric information.Based on the above theories,two tenders combined into one are studied from the two aspects of motivation and regulation:Firstly,based on the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry,combined with practice,the establishment of model analysis of two tenders combined into one incentive nature.First of all,the necessity of stimulating social capital in PPP project is summarized from the participation enthusiasm of social capital,which is inconsistent with the goal of social capital,government disaccord with social capital goal,the information asymmetry in the principalagent relationship.Then,based on the benefit goal and practice case,the paper proves the incentive effect of two tenders combined into one on the construction enterprise to participate in PPP project.Finally,the model is used to prove that the combination of two tenders combined into is an incentive to improve the efforts of construction enterprises in PPP projects by bundling construction and operation.Secondly,based on the theory of regulation failure and incentive regulation,studying the regulation failure of two tenders combined into one.Firstly,from the theory analysis of public goods attribute and privatization,it is clear that he has regulation responsibility in PPP projects.Then,comparing the difference between the procurement rules and roles of construction enterprises participating in PPP projects and the traditional construction projects,it is clear that there is regulation failure and inductive failure links.Finally,in the failure link,through comparison and case analysis,we find out the micro failure problems in practice.Thirdly,based on the incentive regulation theory,in view of the above regulation failure problem,the following regulation measures reconstruction suggestions are put forward: In view of the government control is too weak,two ways of establishing the initial high trust or strengthening the management are put forward.In view of the problem of asset virtualization,some suggestions are put forward to improve the accuracy of estimation and strengthen the audit.In view of the dilemma of incentive and rent extraction,and referring to the research model of Laffont and Tirole,the equilibrium rule is proposed.At the same time,based on the incentive regulation theory,the incentive measures of reputation evaluation and design optimization are constructed.In summary,the main use of literature review,case study and qualitative model,at the theoretical level,the motivation property and regulation failure of two tenders combined into one are analyzed.On the practical level,based on the principle of incentive regulation theory about the design of regulation mechanism,the regulation measures are put forward.This provides theoretical and practical support for the better play of two tenders combined into one,and to ensure the important role of the construction enterprises in the PPP projects.