Research On Market Value Management Of Listed Companies Based On Equity Incentives

After China's stock market entered the era of full circulation,the performance of market capitalization is closely related to the economic interests of major shareholders.The interests of all shareholders tend to be the same.The goals pursued by listed companies are also shifted from maximizing profits and maximizing net assets to maximizing the value of the company.Market value becomes a measure.New standards for listed companies.To establish a market value management system for listed companies and promote the company's share price to truly reflect its intrinsic value,it is necessary to first resolve the issue of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders,and equity incentives are one of the important approaches.Based on the analysis and summarization of the literature and the theory of market value management and equity incentives,this paper deeply studies the mechanism of the listed company's equity incentive behavior and market value management.Based on this,it has different ownership characteristics,different ownership concentration levels,and different incentive models.The research hypothesis was put forward in three aspects,taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research object,and establishing an econometric model for regression analysis.The study found that compared with state-controlled listed companies,non-state-controlled listed companies have more significant market value management effects of equity incentives.Compared with listed compa nies with higher equity concentration,listed companies with lower equity concentration have more significant effect of market value management with equity incentives.Compared with the stock option model,the listed company adopting the restricted stock model has more significant effect on the market value management of equity incentives.