Executive Incentive,Ownership Concentration And Enterprise Innovation Input

The 18 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China(CPC)proposed that China should adhere to the independent innovation path with Chinese characteristics.General Secretary Xi Jinping stressed on several occasions that "to grasp innovation means to grasp development,and to seek innovation means to seek the future." More and more enterprises want to grasp the "ox nose" of innovation.With the introduction of a series of policies to encourage innovation by our government,the overall R & D investment of enterprises in the market has improved to a certain extent,but compared with developed countries,R & D investment is still relatively low,which shows that China still has insufficient investment in innovation,so enterprises should be further stimulated to invest in innovation.However,due to the characteristics of high investment risk and long return cycle,executives tend to reduce their innovation investment on their own initiative for their own interests,this requires a certain incentive mechanism to stimulate the innovation enthusiasm of senior managers,and at the same time,the concentration of enterprise equity is also an important factor affecting enterprise innovation input,and the degree of ownership concentration will also affect the incentive effect of executive incentive on enterprise innovation input.Therefore,this paper mainly studies the relationship among executive incentive,ownership concentration and enterprise innovation input,from the perspective of executive incentive and equity concentration,this paper explores ways to release innovation vitality further.The research in this paper can supplement and perfect the principal-agent theory and incentive theory to some extent,at the same time,it can help enterprises to establish a reasonable incentive mechanism and equity concentration level to improve enterprise innovation vitality.In this paper,the principal-agent theory,the Information asymmetry theory,the convergence theory,the behavior theory and the motivation theory are used to combine the normative research method with the empirical research method,taking listed a-share enterprises in China from 2014 to 2018 as samples,this paper studies the relationship among executive compensation incentive,stock option incentive,promotion incentive and enterprise innovation input,and the relationship between ownership concentration and enterprise innovation input,this paper studies the moderating effect of ownership concentration on top management incentive and innovation investment.Through the empirical and theoretical analysis,the following conclusions aredrawn:(1)there is a positive correlation between executive compensation incentive and technology innovation input.(2)there is a positive correlation between Executive Equity Incentive and technology innovation investment.(3)promotion incentive has a significant negative correlation with technological innovation input.(4)the high concentration of equity will restrain the innovation input of enterprises,so we should avoid over-concentration of equity.(5)when the concentration of stock ownership is relatively high,the incentive effect of executive compensation and executive promotion is not beneficial.At the same time,this paper puts forward some suggestions from the aspects of perfecting the incentive mechanism of senior managers,perfecting the examination mechanism of enterprises,and decentralizing ownership concentration,so as to further stimulate enterprises’ innovation input.