Study On The Market And Model Of Collectively-land Rental Housing Based On Game Theory

In recent years,the price of commercial housing surges,and many accidents occur in rental houses.These housing problems have attracted much attention from all of the society.In order to ensure people’s livelihood and speed up the construction of a "rent-purchase" housing system,the government has issued a policy allowing collectively-land to build rental housing.In this paper,game theory,comparative analysis,game analysis,qualitative and quantitative analysis are all used to study the current situation of China’s rental market and collectively-land rental housing,so as to provide policy recommendations.The main contents and conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)Studying the rental housing system in China from the aspects of policies,market,price and trends.Then,this paper compares it with developed countries such as the United States,Germany and Japan,and putting forward some suggestions to optimize the rental housing system in China.Furthermore,this paper discusses the positioning of collectively-land rental housing in China’s rental housing system from perspectives of necessity and possibility.It helps further research.(2)Under the hypothesis of rationality,the behavior of five main subjects of collectively-land rental housing is analyzed.The result shows that there are four groups of game relations among them,precisely,central government and local government,village collective and local government,village collective and cooperative enterprise,village collective and renter.(3)Four groups of game models are established,and Nash equilibrium of each investor is found by using game analysis methods such as inverse induction method,function solving method and line-drawing method.Suggestions are put forward accordingly.In the Intergovernmental game,the result of the game shows that the central government should supervise the local government.It is suggested that the implementation of the policy should be effectively promoted by improving relevant laws and regulations,establishing scientific performance evaluation indicators,establishing land planning indicators system for rental housing,and establishing information communication system between farmers and the central government.In the game between village collectives and local governments,the result shows that the average rent allocation rate plays a decisive role for villages collectives to choose rental housing model.It is suggested that village collectives increase the rent allocation rate of rental housing from five perspectives: price,location,transportation,supporting facilities and property management,so as to obtain higher profits.In addition,when building public rental housing,village collectives can use relevant formulas to determine the proportion of investment,and then to obtain greater benefits.In the game of village collective and cooperative enterprises,the result shows that the choice of strategy for village collectives depends on its financing cost,and the choice of enterprise strategy depends on the central bank’s economic regulation and control.Policy recommendations include: letting financial institutions play roles;expanding village collectives’ financing methods and providing preferential policies for rental housing enterprises.In the game between the village collective and the renter,the optimal bid and Nash equilibrium for village collective are the functions consisting of the psychological price interval(m,n)of the renter and the conversion coefficients.Through improving the housing rental market and cultivating market-oriented rental intermediaries,Nash equilibrium can be achieved.