Game Theory Research Of Real Estate Project Construction Phase Based On Stakeholder Theory

The project construction stage is the most intensive stage of multi-party cooperation in the process of real estate development,and also the most frequent stage of multi-party games.The cooperation between the real estate developer and other participants at this stage will directly determine the final income of the real estate project.Although the domestic research on the real estate industry has accumulated for many years,the research on the game behavior in the construction phase is still in its infancy.Existing research results mostly revolve around single links such as bidding and bidding.Rarely,from a macro perspective,do systematic research on multi-link game behaviors during the construction phase.This leads to the lack of relatively complete systems for existing research results.This thesis focuses on the real estate project construction stage,based on the relevant basic theories of the real estate project construction stage,stakeholder theory and game theory,to study the game behavior among the various stakeholders in the multi-stage real estate project construction stage.This thesis is divided into six chapters.The first chapter is the introduction.It mainly introduces the research background,research purpose and significance,research status at home and abroad,research content,research methods,technical routes and innovations.The second chapter is an overview of related theories,mainly introducing basic theories related to the construction phase of real estate projects,stakeholder theories and game theory.The third chapter is the game analysis of the real estate project construction stage.Through the analysis and analysis of the existing research results and relevant theoretical foundations,it summarizes the development process of the real estate project construction stage in China and determines that the game behavior is the most representative in the project construction process.The three stages of sexuality are the bidding stage,the on-site construction stage and the performance evaluation stage.Then,combined with the stakeholder theory,the stakeholders in each game stage are clarified.Through the definition and analysis of the behavior characteristics of the stakeholders,the intrinsic behavior motivation of each stakeholder in the game is discussed.The fourth chapter is the analysis of the game model in the construction stage of thereal estate project.According to the analysis results of the third chapter,the game model of the bidding and bidding stage,the game model of the on-site construction stage Game model in the performance evaluation phase.Through game model analysis and simulation,the key influencing factors in the game process at various stages are clarified,and the influence of different stakeholders' different behavior strategies on the game result during the game process is analyzed.Chapter 5 is to improve the management countermeasures during the construction phase of real estate projects.Based on the relevant conclusions obtained in Chapter 4,it proposes management countermeasures based on maximizing the interests of the development party and achieving a win-win cooperation among all stakeholders.Chapter 6 is conclusions and prospects,and summarizes the research conclusions obtained in this thesis,and clarifies the next research direction for the shortcomings of the thesis.The research results show that,as the number of bidders decreases during the bidding stage of real estate projects,the bidding prices of bidders will gradually increase.Based on the perspective of maximizing the interests of the developers themselves,it is necessary to control the number of bidders in the bidding and tendering stage,so as to strengthen the benign competition among the bidders in the bidding and bidding stage and maximize their own interests.In the field construction stage,because of the information asymmetry among various stakeholders,no matter what kind of supervision behavior strategy the developer chooses,it will damage the overall interests.Only by ensuring the exchange of information between the various stakeholders can we achieve the ideal state of multi-win-win.In the performance evaluation stage,the rational use of the reward and punishment mechanism will increase the construction party's willingness to improve the construction quality,drive the entire game process to an optimal equilibrium state,and promote the development party and the construction party to maximize the overall benefits.The conclusion of this thesis affirmed the positive role of expanding the bidding competition and ensuring the multi-party information exchange to establish a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism in the construction stage of real estate projects.The results of the thesis systematically sorted out the game behavior in the real estate project construction stage,filled the gaps in the existing research,and provided theoretical reference and certain guidance for the management of the real estate project construction stage.At the same time,italso provides a targeted strategy for solving the multi-party cooperation problems facing the current real estate project construction stage,which has certain reference significance and practical value for the further standardized development of China's real estate industry and upstream and downstream fields.