Research On Overestimation In Real Estate Evaluation From The Perspective Of Game Theory

With the rapid development of China’s real estate industry,the number of real estate mortgage loans has also increased.Based on the real estate mortgage evaluation report,financial institutions can issue loans at a certain percentage,and whether scientific evaluation of mortgage real estate can be the basis for the bank’s reasonable and effective use of credit funds.At present,there are many irregular behaviors in the real estate appraisal industry,and overestimation of real estate is common.This not only damages the credibility and order of the real estate appraisal industry,but also increases the credit risk of the bank,but it is also not conducive to the healthy development of the market.Therefore,analyzing the reasons for the overestimation of real estate mortgage evaluation and taking specific measures to regulate the real estate mortgage evaluation business are of great significance in preventing financial risks and promoting the stable development of the market.Aiming at the overestimation of real estate appraisal,according to the impact of real estate appraisal agencies on the pressure of interests and relevant stakeholders,this article uses the game theory method to separate real estate appraisal agencies,real estate appraisal agencies and real estate brokerage agencies,real estate appraisal agencies and banks.Construct a game model from various angles,sort out the factors that affect the overestimation behavior of real estate appraisal agencies,and analyze and discuss the impact of these factors on the strategic choice of real estate appraisal agencies.First,from the perspective of normal competition and malicious competition,the game relationship between real estate appraisal agencies is discussed.This article believes that under normal competition,real estate appraisal agencies will eventually choose the "overestimation" strategy,while under malicious competition,they can take measures to reduce overestimation by increasing the review and punishment efforts,and regulating the industry’s minimum charging standards.The occurrence of behavior.Secondly,it discusses the game relationship between real estate appraisal companies and real estate brokerage intermediaries.Through game model analysis,it is believed that relevant regulatory authorities should maintain normal industry fees and increase penalties and intensity.Finally,the game relationship between the real estate appraisal company and the bank is analyzed,and it is considered that the inefficient bank supervision results in prone to information asymmetry problems,which leads to the overestimation of real estate appraisal companies.Therefore,banks can establish a deposit guarantee system and establish professional Appraisers and other methods to improve audit efficiency...