Research On The Evolutionary Game And Simulation About Behavior Constraint Of Dishonest Behavior Existed In C2C Housing Sharing Platform

From personified offline transactions among acquaintances to impersonal online transactions and offline contacts among strangers,the virtual,complex and dynamic nature of the Internet increases the uncertainty and risk of transactions,the crisis of trust is growing while the sharing economy industry penetration and market size is expanding.Housing sharing was the first industry that open the sharing economy market in China and the development of whom is relatively stable.Mainly C2 C mode,housing sharing has expanded the meaning and boundaries of house rental and hotel accommodation,characterized by public participation,risk parity and transaction repeatability,the trust risk of housing sharing is more pervasive and diverse.In the face of illegal monitoring,false advertising,different offline prices and other dishonest behavior from the landlord,malicious damage to housing equipment,property stealing,deceptive positive information and other dishonest behavior from the tenant,setting unfair price by big data,selling users’ information and other dishonest behavior from the sharing platforms,the platforms have certain information advantages,they can undertake governance functions in some degree.In order to avoid the irrational profit-persuing of platforms and ensure the steady development of sharing economy,except "self-discipline","other-discipline" is also needed..Firstly,the domestic and foreign literatures on the trust,the trust in the context of the Internet,and housing sharing regulation are reviewed,the contributions and shortcomings of existing literatures are pointed out.Secondly,on the basis of sharing economy theory,evolutionary game theory,bilateral market theory and social governance theory,considering the reality and the characteristics of housing sharing,two evolutionary games between platform and users,what is more between government and platform are constructed according to the discreditable behavior exsisted in the platforms.Finally,the equilibrium points and influencing factors of the evolutionary game are analyzed by Matlab simulation experiment,on the basis of which the corresponding conclusions are obtained and the directionalsuggestions are put forward.Focusing on the active behavior strategies of all parties,the following conclusions and suggestions are obtained:(1)Focusing on(1,1,1)equilibrium,seven kinds of stable evolutionary can be detected in the three-party evolutionary game,besides,six kinds of stable evolutionary can be detected in the two-party evolutionary game,initial probability plays an important role in evolutionary stability.The government should guide the construction of ‘government-platform-user community of responsibility’and credit information sharing system,strengthen the integrity awareness of all parties,encourage positive behavior and purify the trust environment.(2)Public participation plays an important role in promoting positive behavior,when public sensitivity and participants number are both high,it is necessary to improve the depth and maturity of participation.The "closed" governance should be transformed to "responsive" governance,an unified interactive information platform between the government and the pubulic should be established.(3)The higher the overall network externality,the bilateral user satisfaction and the platform reputation value are,the quicker the positive behaviors of all parties will come into being.what’s more,When the cross-network externalities and sub-network externalities are both positive,the positive behavior of all parties will both quickly come into being.It is necessary to stimulate and make full use of the network benefits and build a high-quality,high-tech and high-service sharing platform.(4)The government and the platform are sensitive to loss,cost,after-cost discount coefficient and loss expansion coefficient,for users,the additional benefits are more worthy of attention than loss.Besides,rewards have more significant effects on the platform behaviors,punishments have more significant effects on government and users’ positive behaviors.the effect of punishments and the discovery rate is prominent..The government should build a more systematic and diversified institutional system and credit system,collaborate with enterprises to establish a long-lasting reward and punishment system,as well as dynamic reward and punishment rules,sitimulate users’ participation by all-round and multiple channels,effectively constraint dishonest behaviors,reduce costs and additional benefits.