The Game Model On Coal Mine Safety Management Research Based On Individual Behavior Under The Perspective Of Bounded Rationality

At present our country has made great progress in coal mine safety management,but the safety accidents have occurred,causing heavy damage to life and property.A lot of subsequent investigation and statistics show that unsafe behavior of people is the major cause of the accident.The thesis takes the unsafe behavioral individual as research object in view of coal mine safety management leading to unsafe behaviors in the process of game process between people and their characteristics,and combins with limited rationality,evolutionary game theory,the multi-agent modeling and so on as the guiding theory,derives the replication dynamic process under different strategies from participants of safety management evolutionary game,solves the equilibrium and analyzes its stability and evolution path,simulates with multi-agent and gives the policy suggestions based on the characteristic of evolution.The main research work and contribution of the paper is on the following aspects.Firstly,the paper turns the research idea of ‘human-machine-environmentmanagement' to the person's unsafe behavior itself with the combination of unsafe behavioral research,and partitions unsafe behavioral individual which involved in coal mine safety management.Due to incomplete information,limited time of decision and limited cognition of individual,complete rational assumption of traditional geme theory can not meet,so the analysis for individual game of coal mine safety management is based on the assumption of bounded rationality,which means individual will learn,imitate,and evolute with each other and the game becomes evolutionary game.Secondly,game of coal mine safety management can be divided into three categories: monomorphic individual of safe behavior,double individuals of safety management and systematic evolution game model,a total of seven game model.Monomorphic individual evolutionary game model of safe behavior includes evolutionary game model of top managers,safety supervision department and production staff.For monomorphic individual evolutionary game model of safe behavior,the paper solves equantequation by replicator dynamics equation,analyzes the stability of the equantequation by replication dynamic equilibrium phase diagram,makes sensitivity analysis and gives the corresponding policy recommendations.Double individuals evolutionary game model of safety management includes evolutionary game model of top managers & production staff,safety supervision department & production staff and top managers & safety supervision department.For double individuals evolutionary game model of safety management,the paper solves equantequation of replicator dynamics equation,analyzes the stability of the equantequation by the value of determinant and trace for Jacobi matrix in equantequation and replication dynamic equilibrium phase diagram and gives the corresponding policy recommendations.Systematic evolution game model is composed of monomorphic and double individuals game model,but because the formula and calculation are complicated,and the evolution process is complilex and not easy to control,so the simulation model is usied for analysis.Thirdly,the paper uses Anylogic to build an agent-based simulation model from the bottom to the top,and makes simulation of monomorphic individual of safe behavior,double individuals of safety management and systematic evolution game model.The simulation model has verified equilibrium stability and evolution path of monomorphic individual,double individuals' evolution game model and found the factors which influencing the double individual and systematic evolutionary game process and put forward some policy suggestions according to these factors.