Research On Enterprise Production Emission Reduction And Government Subsidy Decision Under Carbon Trading

With the continuous progress of the construction of ecological civilization in China,the government has formulated various emission reduction regulations to achieve emission reduction targets as soon as possible.Among them,the carbon trading system is one of the key ways.Therefore carbon quotas have become a kind of production resource for enterprises and will have a significant impact on enterprises' operational decisions.Enterprises that have been included in the carbon trading market have large emission reduction resistance due to lack of awareness of carbon trading and poor emission reduction technologies.So government financial support can ease the difficulties of initial emission reduction and help enterprises adjust their own industrial structure to achieve a smooth carbon transition.However,the difference of the government and the enterprise's interests makes their decision-making behavior must have a complex game relationship.Therefore,this paper constructs a two-stage game model between government and enterprises,applying non-linear planning,game theory,numerical analysis to study enterprises' emission reduction behaviors and the government's subsidy decision.Compare the effects of production and emission reduction subsidies and analyze the impact of related parameters.Firstly,we construct a two-stage game model between individual enterprise and government to obtain the optimal decision of enterprise.The results show that,under no subsidy,the marginal revenues of production-occupied carbon allowances and the marginal cost of emission reductions are the same as the carbon trading prices;the production subsidies encourage enterprises to produce,and the emission reduction subsidy has an effect on the production and emission reduction.When the carbon intensity of enterprises,the abatement cost coefficient,and the carbon trading price are in different ranges,the incentive effects of the two subsidies are also different.Secondly,considering the decision-making behaviors of multiple enterprises which their products are not competitive,they are divided into high-ranking and low-ranking enterprises,and a master-slave game model between government and enterprises is constructed to study enterprises' optimal decision-making behavior under different subsidies.The research results show that under the influence of two kinds of subsidies,enterprise's behavioral decisions and profits differ due to differences in firms.The emission reduction subsidies have the largest emission reduction rate among low-ranking enterprises,and the output of the low-ranking enterprises has the largest output.The carbon trading price is positively correlated with corporate profits,carbon trading volume,emission reduction rate and output is negatively correlated,while social welfare increases first with the increase in carbon price;Under the influence of the carbon trading price and the abatement cost coefficient,for low-ranking enterprises,the profit under the production subsidy is higher than emission reduction subsidy,while those of high-ranking enterprises are opposite.Finally,Considering competition in enterprise products,the enterprises are divided into two types: high-ranking and low-ranking,then the decision-making of enterprises' production and reduction and government subsidy decisions are explored.The research shows that low-ranking enterprises can use their own low-carbon advantages to occupy more shares in the product market,and the profits of low-rank enterprises are greater than high-rank enterprises;When there is no competition with respect to the enterprise's products,there is a large gap between the low-ranking firms and the high-ranking firms' carbon trading volume which have a competitive relationship.The carbon trading volume of the low-ranking firms is at a relatively low level and they tend to use carbon allowances for production.This study starts from the micro level of the enterprise and comprehensively considers the links of production,emission reduction and carbon trading,and analyzes the optimal decision-making behavior of the enterprise and the optimal subsidy decision of government.The conclusions can provide reference for decision-making of enterprises and government.