Research Of Enterprise Production And Product Strategies By Game Model Under The Constraint Of Carbon Emission Trading

With the global-warming crisis and the vigorous development of low-carbon economy,the carbon emission trading mechanism has become an effective economic measure to reduce CO₂ emissions,and has obtained remarkable results.With the flourishing of global low-carbon economy,China is also accelerating the construction of carbon-emission trading market.Each enterprise?all the enterprises involved in this study are manufacturing enterprises,so the“enterprise”and“manufacturer”are indiscriminate used here?adjusts the production strategies to develop low-carbon economy and adapt to the carbon-emission trading policy.Therefore,taking carbon emission trading under the total amount as the research object and starting from carbon emissions trading market,this paper studies the production and product strategy selection of enterprises,respectively,in the environment of monopolistic and competition markets by game theory.Firstly,based on the perspective of production strategy of manufacturers,this paper studies the production strategy selection of manufacturers in the monopolized market environment under the constraint of carbon emission trading.The research shows that:whether or not considering consumer carbon sensitivity,manufacturers choose the technology innovation strategy better,when the price of carbon trading is low;otherwise manufacturers choose the carbon trading strategy better,and will gain profits by selling carbon quotas.However,the existence of consumer carbon sensitivity makes manufacturers choose technology innovation strategy in a narrow range.In the case of high carbon trading price,if the manufacturer chooses technology innovation strategy,the manufacturer's optimal product production is negative,and there is a corner solution,then the manufacturer may choose carbon trading strategy.Secondly,based on the perspective of manufacturer's production strategy,this paper studies the production strategy selection of duopoly manufacturers in the competitive market under the constraint of carbon emission trading.The results show that in the competitive market,if the carbon sensitivity of consumers is not considered,the equilibrium of duopoly manufacturers is?T,T?.When the consumer is very sensitive to price,the equilibrium of duopoly manufacturers is?7?S,S?8?.In the competitive market and considering the carbon sensitivity of consumers,manufacturer1 and manufacturer 2 will not choose the same strategy.Regardless of considering the carbon sensitivity of consumers,in the model?T,S?,the production quantity of manufacturer who chooses technology innovation strategy is always the largest among the three models.Thirdly,based on the perspective of manufacturer's product strategy,this paper studies the product strategy of manufacturer in the monopolized market under the constraint of carbon emission trading.It is found that,without considering the carbon sensitivity of consumers,when manufacturers produce ordinary products,the wholesale price and sales volume are positively correlated with consumers'preference for ordinary products,while when manufacturers produce low-carbon products,the conclusion is opposite.When the carbon sensitivity of consumers is ignored,regardless of manufacturers'production strategies,wholesale prices and sales volumes are negatively correlated with carbon trading prices and positively correlated with consumer conversion rates.Only when consumers have a low preference for ordinary products and the carbon trading price is high,manufacturers will choose to produce low-carbon products.In other cases,manufacturers will produce ordinary products.When considering the carbon sensitivity of consumers,the wholesale price and sales volume are reduced compared with that without considering the carbon sensitivity of consumers.Manufacturers still choose to produce low-carbon products when consumers'preference for ordinary products is low and the carbon trading price is high,while consumers'carbon sensitivity further increases the strategic space for manufacturers to choose low-carbon products.In addition,this study found that raw material suppliers and manufacturers have highly consistent product strategy preferences,and there is no product strategy conflict between manufacturers and suppliers.The total carbon emission of manufacturers producing low-carbon products is not necessarily less than producing ordinary products,especially when consumers are more sensitive to carbon.Therefore,in this situation,the total consumption of low-carbon products increases dramatically also means the production of low-carbon products has increased substantially.Finally,based on the perspective of manufacturer's product strategy,this paper studied the product strategy selection of duopoly manufacturer in the competitive market under the constraint of carbon emission trading.The results show that in the competitive market,without considering carbon sensitivity of consumers,when the carbon trading price is low and consumers have a low preference for ordinary products,the manufacturer's balanced product strategy is both to produce low-carbon products;when the carbon trading price is low and consumers have a high degree of preference for ordinary products,the manufacturer's balanced product strategy is both to produce ordinary products.In other cases,there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium,and as the unit carbon emission reduction of low-carbon products increases relative to ordinary products,the strategic space for manufacturers both to produce low-carbon products increases.Moreover,considering the carbon sensitivity of consumers,when the carbon trading price is low and consumers have a low preference for ordinary products,the manufacturer's balanced product strategy is both to produce low-carbon products;when the carbon trading price is low and consumers have a high degree of preference for ordinary products,the manufacturer's balanced product strategy is both to produce ordinary products,which is consistent with not considering the carbon sensitivity of consumers.But with the increase of the carbon sensitivity of consumers,the strategic space for manufacturers both to produce low-carbon products or ordinary products simultaneously decreases.There are three innovations in this paper.Firstly,the research perspective is novel.To start with,this paper studied the enterprises production and product strategies in the monopolized market under the constraint of carbon emission trading,and then expands the research perspective to the competitive market,enriching the relevant research.Next,from the perspective of industrial chain,this paper brings manufacturers and raw material suppliers into the unified framework,and analyses the strategy selection when manufacturers do not have the ability of technological innovation.Finally,this paper discusses the carbon emission reduction policies such as carbon quota and carbon emission trading,and studies how to achieve a satisfactory game result under the constraints of carbon emission trading through policy regulation,which provides a useful reference for the government to formulate carbon emission reduction policies.Secondly,the research methods is innovation.Initially,this paper chooses the relevant knowledge of game theory to study the monopoly and competitive market,respectively,and organically integrates the relevant theories to explore the manufacturer's strategy selection under the constraint of carbon emissions trading.This research method is more in line with the actual situation of manufacturer's strategy research.Moreover,this paper not only studies the manufacturer's production strategy and product strategy selection in the competitive market from the static game perspective,but also from the dynamic game perspective.The difference of status among different players?leaders and followers?applies static and dynamic game methods to find their equilibrium strategies.Most scholars studied the choice of strategies among manufacturers,without considering the advantages and disadvantages of the order of manufacturers'decision-making.And considering dynamic game is more in line with the actual market environment.Additionally,the parameters are set and calibrated on the basis of referring to a large number of existing literatures,and detailed numerical simulation analysis is carried out based on this.Thirdly,in the process of building the model,this paper distinguished the production decision and product decision-making of enterprises,the sensitive and insensitive situation of consumers'demand for carbon,the static game and dynamic game of enterprises,and obtains 37 related propositions.Furthermore,we studied the production and product strategy selection of enterprises,the decision-making of suppliers and the total amount of carbon emissions.Therefore,compared with the existing studies,this paper makes a more detailed study on the strategy selection of multi-agents such as“supplier-manufacturer-government”under the constraints of carbon emissions trading.Although this paper studies the production and product strategy selection of enterprises in the competitive market under the constraints of carbon emissions trading,it mainly focuses on duopoly competitive enterprises.In real life,there are often more than two competing enterprises,which is equivalent to expanding the number of enterprises under the duopoly model,and it will not have a great impact on the main conclusions of this paper.The conclusion of this paper can provide some useful ideas for enterprises to choose production strategy and product strategy under the restriction of carbon emission trading,and can also provide useful reference for the government to formulate policies related to carbon emission reduction and achieve green sustainable development.