Research On The Institutional Change Of Environmental Protection Supervision In China

Eco-environmental protection is currently the top concern of the international community.With the rapid development of China’s national economy,the increasingly serious environmental pollution problems such as water,soil and atmosphere,and the evolution of the top-level macro-environmental protection pattern,facing the juxtaposition of poor environmental foundation,weak capacity,large population and high demands,the current central government’s environmental policy of green development has repeatedly encountered the dilemma of policy implementation of "bureaucratic depletion" and the dilemma of supervision and accountability of "Strip differentiation" in the implementation process of sinking into local governments.The specific manifestation is that the local government’s environmental governance responsibility is not fulfilled in advance and the central government has difficulty in investigating the local environmental governance responsibility afterwards.This paper simplifies the research variables and focuses on the intrinsic factors that influence the emergence of the two major dilemmas.The reason for the dilemma of local government’s passive environmental governance behavior and national environmental governance’s "bureaucratic depletion" policy implementation lies in the existence of interest objectives between local and central governments,and the divergences and environmental supervision system are not sound enough.The reason for local government’s opportunistic environmental governance evasion is the low symmetry of environmental governance information between central and local governments and the institutional loopholes of block supervision.Through the content analysis of the stage changes of the national environmental protection supervision system which has been slightly mature since its inception in2004 and until 2018,and by the review of the design objectives,background and process of the national environmental protection supervision system,revealing the two links between the supervision objectives,subject and mechanism and the central and local governments in the supervision of the implementation and implementation of environmental policies.Based on the analysis of the dynamic game model between local government and central government,exploring the realistic origin of the implementation of environmental protection supervision system by central government and the continuous improvement of the system.The non-continuous game between central government and local government in the field of environmental governance is based on the comparison of expected revenue and expected cost.With the strategic choice,the result of the game between the two sides produces a Nash equilibrium but not the optimal system,which needs to be improved.At the same time,with the continuous development and change of the institutional environment,thesystem equilibrium is broken,and then it will enter the next round of game cycle.problems is the driving force of the change of the national environmental protection supervision system,the dynamic change of the national environmental protection supervision system is the strategic choice of the interaction between the central government and the local government.Through the game model,continuing to deduce and analyze its change motivation,change goal and path dependence law.The central government’s strategy is to build a gradually sound system of environmental protection supervision,in order to achieve the goal of strengthening the ecological responsibility of the ecological environment construction of the national bureaucratic system and promoting the consistent environmental behavior of the central and local governments.Through the analysis of the system structure of environmental protection supervision system,the research shows that in the face of the game behavior of local governments under the conditions of elastic space of environmental policy and asymmetric information,the central response strategy combination is to strengthen the conventional supervision mechanism and create the supervision group mechanism,so as to solve the dual reality dilemma of environmental governance,that is,The overall inefficient environmental governance caused by the inefficiency of local environmental governance,and environmental regulatory inability of the Central Government due to the evasion of the responsibility of local government environmental governance.The network coordination and supervision mechanism formed by the central authority and the Ministry of Environmental Protection through the phased reform and change of the national environmental protection supervision system takes into account the integration and coordination of the various responsibilities of environmental protection(party and government responsibilities),which makes it possible for the "good governance" of the national environment.