The Collusion Between Local Governments And Enterprises,Land Grant Pattern And Environmental Pollution

China's economy has performed a rapid and lasting growth,but at the same time,excessive use of resources,environmental pollution and ecological damage have become increasingly prominent,and environmental pollution problems have become an important factor affecting both China's sustainable development of economy and the stability of society.People's attention has also shifted from environmental pollution itself to various causes of environmental pollution in order to remove the root cause for this problem and achieve the coordinated development of national economy and ecological environment.However,no matter from local governments or from the perspective of enterprises,to make analyses of the causes of environmental pollution is one-sided,because environmental pollution is the result of the interaction between local governments and enterprises,and the collusion between local governments and enterprises provides a new perspective to analyze environmental pollution.At the same time,local governments occupy the monopoly position in the primary land market,and are pursued by enterprises.Under the background of promotion tournament,local officials often keep in touch with local enterprises in order to improve their political prospects,and achieve mutual benefit through collusion,but often at the expense of the environment.This phenomenon is also common in the primary land market.Based on this background,this paper discusses environmental pollution from the perspective of the collusion between local governments and enterprises,combining with the analysis of the local government behavior in the process of land granting.Firstly,this paper makes a detailed analysis of how to achieve the collusion between local governments and enterprises under rotation system of Chinese governors,and to proxy for the collusion between local governments and enterprises we exploit the internally promoted municipal party secretary.An internally promoted municipal party secretary is from the same region where she/he has served,such as a municipal party secretary who has been working as the mayor in the same city.Secondly it introduces public choice theory,promotion tournament theory,principal-agent theory,externality theory and the theory of race to the bottom as the theoretical foundation of the behavioral logic of local governments and enterprises.Then based on the interest game among the central government,local governments and enterprises,this paper explores two effect mechanisms of the collusion between local governments and enterprises on environmental pollution theoretically,combining with the analysis of the local government behavior in the process of land granting.Firstly,the collusion between local governments and enterprises directly affects environmental regulation and environmental protection investment,which is called direct effect mechanism,secondly,the collusion between local governments and enterprises,in terms of affecting the proportion of two-stage auction of industrial land,influences environmental pollution,which is called indirect effect mechanism.At the same time,this paper analyzes local officials' personal characteristics,current situation of the market of land grant,current situation of environmental pollution and their coupling relations,and according to the data about local officials,land grant,economy and environment in 69 large and medium-sized cities from 2008 to 2016,the direct and indirect effects of the collusion between local governments and enterprises on environmental pollution are empirically tested based on panel model and mediation effect model.The results are as follows:(1)The collusion between local governments and enterprises will increase the proportion of two-stage auction of industrial land.(2)Increasing the proportion of twostage auction of industrial land will aggravate environmental pollution.(3)The collusion between local governments and enterprises will directly aggravate environmental pollution.(4)The collusion between local governments and enterprises will aggravate environmental pollution by increasing the proportion of two-stage auction of industrial land.(5)Urban macroeconomic factors and personal characteristics of the municipal party secretary will have different effects on environmental pollution.Based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward policy suggestions to solve environmental pollution problems under the background of the collusion between local governments and enterprises.Firstly,improving the political incentive mechanism of local officials,and blocking the interest chain of the collusion between local governments and enterprises.Secondly,strengthening the rotation system of Chinese governors and breaking the relation net between local governments and enterprises.Thirdly,the central government should strengthen supervision and standardize the local government behavior in the process of land grant.Fourthly,local governments should strengthen the supervision of local enterprises and encourage enterprises to implement technological innovation.