Font Size: a A A

An Analysis Of The Reasons For The Collusion Between The Government And The Enterprises In The Environmental Regulation Of China

Posted on:2021-04-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J W LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2381330611953000Subject:Economics of Regulation
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Over the past 40 years of reform and opening up,China's economy has achieved sustained,healthy and stable development.China's reform from planned economy to market economy has made great progress and made remarkable achievements.Since the economic development entered the new normal in 2012,China's economy has changed from nearly 10% of the past high-speed growth to about 7% of the medium high-speed growth,and has become the second largest economy in the world.However,behind China's rapid and medium high-speed economic growth,there are often "high accidents" in environmental aspects,such as global warming,sea-level rise caused by melting glaciers,excessive pollutant emissions from industrial enterprises,and increasingly severe smog in different cities,which all remind us that in the past,we overemphasized economic growth,but ignored environmental protection and other aspects Problems,make some major environmental pollution problems common,make China enjoy the economic "high growth" dividend,at the same time,it is inevitable to pay a heavy price.At the same time,behind the increasingly close relationship between the government,enterprises,industries and other microeconomic subjects,it is not difficult to find that the frequent occurrence of "high accidents" in environmental aspect is that the government has lost its responsibility to perform "moral man".The "visible hand" of the government has not played a very good role and failed to meet the inherent requirements of the effective socialist market economy of the government and the market?Under the pressure of political achievements or the motive of seeking the maximum of his own interests,he often uses information advantages to form a community of interests with the same high-income enterprises,acting as the "umbrella" of enterprises,and conspiring with enterprises.Therefore,this paper will take the collusion of government and enterprise as the starting point,study the collusion behavior between local government and enterprise in environentalregulation,analyze the main reasons for the collusion of government and enterprise in environmental regulation,and put forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions,which has very important theoretical and practical significance.The article is divided into six parts.First of all,it introduces the research background and significance,research methods,basic framework and main content,innovation and shortcomings.Secondly,by combing the domestic and foreign scholars on the environmental regulation of the collusion between government and enterprises,we can find the research perspective and methods.Thirdly,it analyzes the relevant theoretical basis,and then discusses the information asymmetry theory,public interest theory and regulation capture theory.Then,the paper discusses the causes of the collusion of government and enterprise in environmental regulation of our country,analyzes the causes of the collusion of government and enterprise by constructing two levels of principal-agent model of the collusion of government and enterprise,and analyzes the current situation of the collusion of government and enterprise in environmental regulation of our country according to the conclusion of the model,theory and practice.Then,on the basis of the above analysis,the panel data of 30 provinces in China from 2005 to 2014 are used for empirical test,further confirming the conclusions of theoretical model analysis.Finally,from the regulatory functions,the third-party supervision(mainly social news media),laws and regulations system and incentive mechanism,the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.
Keywords/Search Tags:Environmental regulation, Collusion between government and enterprises, principal-agent, third-party regulation
PDF Full Text Request
Related items