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Cooperation For Waste Bike-Sharing Recovery Based On Evolutionary Game

Posted on:2021-04-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z Q WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2381330602482705Subject:Logistics engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Bike-sharing is a product of the mobile Internet.Its rapid development has also brought new environmental problems.On the one hand,a large number of used or still available bicycles have been discarded,which has imposed a burden on the ecological environment and also blocked the city management.On the other hand,some bicycle companies lack overall planning and blindly spread their stalls.It is a huge waste of resources.Because the recycling value of used and shared bicycles is not high,the interests between related entities cannot be effectively guaranteed,and it is difficult for the government to coordinate the interests of various entities.Therefore,the recycling of used and shared bicycles has become a serious environmental problem.Against this background,based on the evolutionary game model,this article analyzes the interactions and interest relationships among the three main bodies of policy makers,bicycle manufacturers,and bicycle operators,and provides theoretical and practical support for the government to formulate relevant policies and enterprises to make relevant decisions..First of all,this article analyzes the development status of shared bicycles and finds that the main reasons for the dfficulty of recycling shared bicycles are the low recycling value,the difficulty in coordinating the interests of enterprises,and insufficient government supervision.Based on the above issues and the related literature,this paper proposes the concept of cooperative recycling,establishes the shared bicycle as the research object,and takes the interest coordination mechanism between the main bodies of the shared bicycle as the core issue of the study.It uses the evolutionary game theory foundation to study the government and bicycle manufacturing enterprises.And the factors that influence their behavior.Secondly,the key influencing factors that restrict the recycling of used and shared bicycles were identified,and an evolutionary game model between the government and the bicycle platform operator was established for the cooperative recovery mechanism.Based on this model,the effects of government regulation costs and benefits,and operator input costs and benefits on system stability are analyzed.The research results show that:when the cost of the operator's input is less than the market benefit,the operator will choose to invest;when the difference between the operator's input cost and the market benefit is greater than the sum of the government's reward and punishment,the operator will choose not to invest;when the conditions are appropriate,the system There will be no steady state.Further,establish an evolutionary game model between the bicycle manufacturer and the platform operator.Based on this model,four decisions are taken into account:manufacturer input,operator input,both manufacturer and operator input,and neither manufacturer nor operator input.The situation,through the analysis model to study the impact of factors such as cooperation benefits,cooperation costs,betrayal benefits on the subject's final strategy.The research results show that measures such as increasing input revenue,reducing input costs,and reducing betrayal benefits are beneficial to the willingness of manufacturers and platforms to invest.Third,the government,manufacturers,and operators are incorporated into the same analysis framework,and a three-party evolutionary game model is constructed to study the behavior evolution of the three in the same system,and obtain regulatory and input costs,additional benefits,government incentives,government fines,The combination of stable equilibrium strategies of the system with different parameters such as betrayal income.The research results show that:when the income of the three changes,there will be multiple evolutionary stabilization strategies;if the betrayal returns of the manufacturer and the platform are too large,the possibility of both parties choosing "cooperation" will be reduced;The punishment of "free-riding" behavior is conducive to the evolution of the system to the ideal state mode.Finally,this article analyzes the related events of shared bicycles in Hangzhou in recent years,deeply summarizes the correlation between the actual situation and the theoretical model research,and verifies the validity of the model through case data.At the same time,in order to promote the efficient implementation of the cooperative recycling model of shared bicycles,this article also puts forward some specific suggestions based on the relevant research conclusions.
Keywords/Search Tags:evolutionary game, free-floating bike sharing, cooperative recovery, replicator dynamics equation
PDF Full Text Request
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