Research On The Decision-making And Evolutionary Game Of A Mix-channel Green Supply Chain

With the deployment of carbon neutrality and peak carbon dioxide emission strategy in recent years,the green industry characterized by low carbon and environmental protection has also developed continuously,and the enterprises in the green supply chain have received increasing attention.From the perspective of cooperation within the supply chain,the advertisement of green enterprises helps all members in the whole supply chain system to cultivate a corporate image focused on environmental protection and therefore expand the market share.Meanwhile,the costsharing collaboration between upstream and downstream enterprises has been widely applied in practice.Facing the complicated and changeable external economic environment,compared with the traditional manufacturing industry,green enterprises characterized by new technology or environmental-friendly raw materials are also facing more uncertainty risks.Based on the above economic and social background,the main research contents of this thesis can be summarized as follows:Firstly,the research explores the effect of retailer’s advertising investment in green supply chain and its influence on enterprise’s balanced decisions.The effects of the retailer’s risk preference and the upstream manufacturer’s risk preference on balanced profit are also considered.This study verifies the driving effect of advertising investment on the balanced profit of the whole supply chain;the retailer with higher risk acceptance tends to invest more in advertising marketing.However,although the higher risk acceptance level can improve the retailer’s profit,it will bring about the decrease in the profit of the manufacturer and the whole supply chain.Secondly,the influence of low-carbon cost sharing contract on system equilibrium decisions is analyzed,and the optimal level of government green subsidy is explored in the expansion model.Moreover,a multi-cycle repeated game model is further established to analyze the characteristics of the dynamic system.The main results in this section are summarized as follows: The profit of the system increases firstly and then decreases with the retailer’s sharing ratio;the retailer’s optimal strategy is different from that of the system;only when the green input efficiency is lower than a certain threshold,will the government provide green subsidies.In the dynamic game model,the stability of the system decreases with the increase of the retailer’s share ratio,but appropriate delay feedback from the decision makers can effectively control the chaos of the system.Thirdly,considering the disturbance of external market demand and production cost,the adjustment strategy of enterprises’ equilibrium decision is analyzed in the centralized and decentralized model respectively.The results show that the original production plan is robust when the market disrupt slightly;the economic significance for enterprises to know the market information and make timely adjustments depends on the level of disruption severity.Under the centralized decision-making model,the optimal price of the system is negatively correlated with the level of enterprise risk aversion and positively correlated with the level of low-carbon investment.Under the decentralized decision-making model,the manufacturer’s low-carbon input can be passed on to the retailer by raising the wholesale price.