Research On Multiagent Decision Of Clean Production In Cement Production Enterprises Under The Evolutionary Game

As a large country of cement production,cement production brings high economic benefits and causes serious environmental pollution.How to improve the production process of cement,reduce the impact of cement enterprises on the environment,and promote the development of cement production enterprises in the direction of green and environmental protection has become a very concerned issue by the government and all sectors of society.At the same time,with the rapid development of industrialization,the notion of clean production has been deeply rooted in the men's mind,and China has put forward corresponding policies and measures for clean production,However,how to promote the effective implementation of cleaner production in enterprises is a social concern.In this paper,the cement production enterprises are taken as the research object,and the implementation of cleaner production in cement production enterprises is studied from the perspectives of government supervision and government subsidies.The evolutionary game model of cleaner production in cement enterprises under different perspectives is established for analysis and research.First of all,the evolutionary game model of government supervision department and cement production enterprise is established.In the process,the public evaluation is taken as an important parameter to participate in the discussion.At the same time,the implementation of cleaner production is affected by the change of parameters,which is positively related to the fines collected by the government for illegal production,the social benefits obtained by the government's strict supervision,and the environmental benefits obtained by the enterprise's cleaner production;and negatively related to the cost of the government's strict supervision,the cost difference and the economic benefit difference of the cement enterprise's cleaner production ? Among them,the cost of supervision and production and the evaluation of the public are the important factors that affect the choice of participants' strategies.Then,from the perspective of government subsidies,the evolutionary game model of government departments and cement production enterprises is established,the parameters are analyzed,and the influence of government subsidies on the implementation of clean production is explored.Finally,the results are illustrated by numerical simulation.The results show that the evolution model of government departments and cement enterprises has a stable point of evolution,and government subsidies and the amount of government punishment to enterprises are important factors affecting the strategic choice of both sides.Finally,summarize the result of the analysis of the three models,this paper analyzes the reasons of influence enterprise cleaner production of cement,government regulators,third party environmental inspection agencies,and cement production enterprise,the strategy of government departments put forward reasonable Suggestions,on how to promote every aspect at the same time puts forward some measures for the effective implementation of cleaner production in cement enterprises to further enrich the content of the implementation of cleaner production in cement enterprises.There are 35 figures,14 tables and 73 references.