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Research On Evolutionary Game Of Coal Enterprise Merger And Acquisition Under Government Regulation

Posted on:2019-04-23Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2371330566963433Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The merger and reorganization of enterprises is an important means to eliminate backward production capacity,safeguard the safety level of the coal industry,increase industrial concentration and resource utilization,increase product added value,realize large-scale production,and extend the coal industry chain.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to study the merger and acquisition activities of coal enterprises.This paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the coal and mining subject-object coal enterprises,local governments and coal companies from the perspectives of market regulation,indirect local government regulation,and direct regulation,explores the optimal evolution strategies of the various stakeholders in M&A activities under different scenarios,and puts forward practical policy recommendations for improving the management and control mechanism of merger and acquisition management in coal enterprises eventually.Based on the analysis of the status quo and problems of coal companies' mergers and acquisitions,the paper mainly adopts the evolutionary game method to study the interests of the participants in the mergers and acquisitions of coal enterprises under the three scenarios.It mainly studies and explores the following aspects:(1)The merger and reorganization of coal enterprises mainly includes horizontal reorganization and vertical integration of industrial chain.The reorganization includes the purchase of assets,the acquisition of agreements,the replacement of assets,and the capital increase.The reorganization aims mainly at horizontal integration and vertical integration.There are also some Enterprises seek asset adjustment,business transformation,and diversified development strategy requirements.More than 90% of mergers and acquisitions and reorganizations occurred between the same provinces,with few mergers and reorganizations across provinces.The existence of such issues as high cost of mergers and acquisitions,potential safety risks and potential risks,low level of market-oriented operation,and difficulties in the integration of corporate culture hinder the smooth progress of mergers and acquisitions in coal enterprises.(2)The bargaining game model and evolutionary game model between M&A subject-object coal enterprises are constructed from the perspective of market regulation scenarios and indirect regulation scenarios of local governments.The research shows that: Under the market regulation scenario,the coal companies' M&A agreement is mainly affected by the size of the discount factors of both parties and the duration of the negotiation process.Under the scenario of indirect control of local governments,when the success rate of local governments in negotiating coal companies is lower,and the difference between the value of coal companies agreeing to mergers and acquisitions and refusal of mergers and acquisitions is greater than the extra net income of coal companies when local government negotiations are successful,the more coal companies tend to agree to implement the strategy of mergers and acquisitions.(3)The paper constructs an evolutionary game model between local government and coal enterprise from the perspective of local government directly regulating situations.The research shows that: The attitudes of coal companies and local governments to M&A activities are mainly related to the cost of self-paid and the amount of benefits brought by the implementation of the behavior.The greater the government's supervision,the more the system tends to develop towards the equilibrium strategy(1,1).And the government's supervisory intensity is in a reverse relationship with the government's discovery of additional preferential terms offered by coal companies when they refuse to make a merger,and it is in a same change relationship with the extra costs and incentives that coal companies have agreed to acquire.(4)Based on the evolutionary game research results among the relevant stakeholders of the merger and acquisition activities of coal enterprises under the above-mentioned different scenarios.This paper puts forward some suggestions for improving the management mechanism of mergers and acquisitions of coal enterprises from four aspects: the perfection of the taxation system,the improvement of the service system,the effective supervision and restriction mechanism,and the scientific incentive mechanism,which can provide the basis for the government to effectively guide the merger and reorganization of coal enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:coal enterprise mergers and acquisitions, market regulation, government direct regulation, government indirect regulation, evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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