Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Reverse Supply Chain For Waste Sorting And Recycling From The Perspective Of Government Regulation

The level of waste treatment not only represents the development level of a city,but also is an important factor to promote the sustainable development of a city nowadays with increasingly prominent environmental problems.China has been promoting waste classification and recycling for a long time but it does little work.The unwillingness of residents,insufficient recycling standards and the phenomenon that the manufacturers do not assume the responsibility as producers all have become obstacles to waste classification and recycling.At the same time,the related law and system of the waste sorting and recycling in China continue to improve with more efforts of all people.This paper studies issues including the model construction of the system of the waste sorting and recycling in China,the contract incentive of the supply chain,the government supervision and management,hoping to provide some reference for the government and relevant enterprises in making decisions.This paper first studies the supply chain of the waste sorting and recycling composed of residents,a recycling enterprise,a green remanufacturing enterprise and a government under the information symmetry situation.It studies the supply chain decision model of recycling enterprises' leading and manufacturing enterprises' leading modes considering residents' benefits under the situation of government subsidizing to recycling enterprises.Through the research on the cooperative mode of recycling enterprises and manufacturing enterprises,it is found that the recycling price and waste classification quantity are both higher than the corresponding value under the decentralized decision,which proves the marginal effect of the system under the decentralized decision.Then the coordination of the supply chain system could be realized by designing the recycling cost sharing contract.Besides,the people with high level of environmental awareness and low time value are more suitable to sort and recycle waste through example analysis.Recycling enterprises and manufacturing enterprises depends less on government subsidies in high-yield market environment.Overall,the government subsidy can increase the amount of recycling waste,add the revenue of all supply chain subjects and promote the waste recycling work.Secondly,this paper studies the incentive mechanism of recycling and manufacturing enterprises on the basis of their cooperation and uncertainty of their risk preferences from the perspective of government subsidizing to manufacturing enterprises considering the information asymmetry in information economics,moral hazard and adverse selection.The principal-agent theory is used to build the dynamic master-slave game composed of the recycling enterprises and manufacturing enterprises and get the optimal contract design.It is found that the contract can only be effective when the recycling enterprise presents risk aversion,and the increase of the risk coefficient of the manufacturing enterprise will improve the linear return of the recycling enterprise,while the increase of the risk coefficient of the recycling enterprise will reduce the linear return.The profit sharing ratio of H-type recycling enterprises with high technology level is always higher than that of L-type enterprises,and the higher the technology level is,the greater the linear profit will be.However,only when the L-type recycling enterprises reach a certain level can they generate positive profit for themselves.The simulation results show that compared with the remanufacturing income of manufacturing enterprises,the incentive effect of government subsidy on recycling enterprises is limited,but it can play a coordinating role in supply chain.The low-standard recycling industry is more conducive to the survival and development of L-type recycling enterprises,but not in line with the long-term development of the supply chain.The cost of recycling enterprises is the biggest factor hindering the efficiency of waste sorting and recycling,and the key to reduce the cost is to improve the recycling ability and professional quality of recycling personnel.Then take the government as the subject in the supply chain to study the influence of the recycling industry standardization and government decision on the supply chain with the regulations of rewards and punishment from the government on the cooperation under the condition of recycling enterprises presenting risk avoidance and manufacturing enterprises presenting risk neutrality.It is found that when the government's reward and punishment income to manufacturing enterprises is negative,the government's reward and punishment amount and recycling industry standardization have a regulatory effect on the behavior of manufacturing enterprises.At the same time,the government can balance the earnings of manufacturing enterprises and recycling enterprises and the optimal recovery amount in the supply chain by reasonably regulating the reward and punishment amount.It is found that the recycling industry standardization significantly improves the government revenue and the amount of waste recycling,and the improvement has an incremental effect through the simulation.The recovery cost also hinders the government's revenue,and when the recovery cost is low,the government's revenue will increase significantly with the reduction of the recycling enterprise's cost.Therefore,the government should help reduce the recovery cost of recycling enterprises in the supply chain so that they can obtain higher profits while promoting the efficient operation of the supply chain.At last,according to the conclusions found in this paper,suggestions and decisionmaking directions for the government,recycling enterprises and manufacturing enterprises to engage in recycling activities are put forward to help the supply chain run more stably and efficiently.At the same time,this paper points out the shortcomings of the research and the direction of further research.