Study On Three Gorges Reservoir Operation Based On The Cooperative Game

With a series of large hydraulic engineering putting into operation in our country,they can control flood,irrigate,supply water,generate electricity,shipping and so on,which plays an important role for the social security and promotes the sustainable development of economic.However,due to the differences in the water use process of different purposes,the comprehensive management of them also raises higher and higher requirements.It is a new challenge in the comprehensive management of modern water resources of how to coordinate the water demand contradiction between different water agents and find the acceptable water allocation solution for each agent.In water resources management,we usually adopts the multi-objective decision-making model to optimize the water agent about conflicts,which can achieve overall revenue optimization.However,these model can get only the non-inferior solution set,and the final decision results are determined by the superior water management agent.Therefore the solution can't reflect the interaction between the water agents,causing a low efficiency.The cooperative game model can break through the efficiency and fair dilemma of multi-objective optimization decision-making,and realize the optimization of overall benefit(collective rationality)on the basis of individual rationality.We apply it in the water requirement conflicts research between power generation and environment of the reservoir system,so that we can coordinate the contradiction between the two agents,providing theoretical support for the cooperation of developing and utilizing of water resources.The main contents of this thesis are as follows:1.Through to analyzing the runoff of yichang hydrological station before and after the impoundment of the Three Gorges reservoir,it was concluded that in recent years the trend of average annual runoff is downward,and due to the effects of storage and discharge during the flood season impounding period and dry season,the water runoff is regulated;In order to reflect the changes of the month environmental flow,based on the natural month flow process to divide the level year,we generated three typical year's minimum and appropriate river environmental flow process using the improved flow duration curve method and compared with the Tennant method.2.To achieve the target of sum satisfaction maximum between the agents of power generation and river environment under different weights,we established a multi-objective model;Based on the construction of power generation and environmental agent's revenue function,we established a coupled two-phase cooperation game model by a single game process of water management agent(first phase)and power generation and environment of the cooperative game process(second phase),the total revenue was obtained and allocated by using the Nash-Harsanyi negotiation solution,Shapley method and nucleolus method.3.The operation performance of multi-objective model was evaluated from time and quantity reliability.Results show that with the increasing of environmental agent's weight and by adjusting the discharge of each time,the model can meet the output and make each time damage becomes shallow,but the destruction number change smaller;Comparing the cooperative game model with single objective and multi-objective model from the perspective of total revenue and profit of each agent,we find that the solution based on cooperative game can make the participants gain more than their individual actions,and increase the total revenue of the cooperative alliance.However the multi-objective model can only achieve the increase of the overall revenue.4.According to the characteristics of the modeling and the allocation of revenue,from the assumption of the model,the agents of water management and utilization,the model objective function,the solution of the model and its effect six aspects,we had a comprehensive comparison between the cooperative game model and the multi-objective model;Based on the social choice theory of voting statutory selection,selecting higher acceptance allocation of two agents,and using PTD,power index method based on the theory of economics to quantitatively evaluated the stability of the model.