A Game Study On Government Subsidies In The Supply Chain Of New Energy Vehicles

With the continuous progress of the society,the continuous economic growth also leads to the problem of energy shortage,and the ecological environment has paid a heavy price,resulting in the decline of people's quality of life.In recent years,China has promoted the development of new energy industry to the national strategic level.Therefore,green economy and low-carbon development have attracted the attention of the society and scholars.Due to the seriousness of environmental pollution,the development of traditional automobiles is restricted.The state advocates the consumption of new energy automobiles and realizes the industrialization structure of new energy automobiles.China's new energy vehicles started late,the core technology of the automotive industry is not complete,the scarcity of key parts and raw materials,resulting in high cost of new energy,in addition,although people have improved their awareness of environmental protection,but not fully accept the idea of new energy vehicles.Therefore,government support is the catalyst for new energy vehicles.Financial support can alleviate the problem of high research and development costs.It can also stimulate the enthusiasm of consumers for new energy vehicles,stimulate domestic demand,and occupy a certain automobile consumption market.Therefore,government intervention becomes a necessary means to develop new energy.The government has introduced a series of policies to support the new energy industry,the most important means is fiscal subsidies.From the perspective of financial subsidies,this paper analyzes the game behavior among decision-making bodies in the supply chain of new energy vehicles.Through the analysis of the externality characteristics of new energy vehicles,based on the calculation of utility function,it can be seen that both consumers' purchase of new energy vehicles and enterprises' production and operation of new energy vehicles are affected by government subsidies,indicating that the government is a necessary means to guarantee the development of new energy vehicle industry,and the three complement each other and contain each other.In building the model,first,considering government subsidies for consumers,the supply chain,the new energy vehicles decentralized decision and centralized decision analysis of manufacturers and retailers,comparing two decision mode of profit distribution and profit situation,build a stackelberg game model,through the example analysis: cooperation mode of individual income are higher than the cooperation pattern,and lower sales price,market demand,the whole supply chain profit increase,is the best choice for both;Secondly,considering the government subsidies for manufacturers enterprises,the introduction of consumer preferences,the game's research shows that the price of the traditional automobile manufacturers,sales and profits are negative correlation with government subsidies,on the other hand,the new energy automobile manufacturers were positively correlated,with government subsidies can attract more into the new energy automobile production enterprises,to a certain extent reduce the use of a conventional car,government subsidies and calculated the optimal price;Taking byd company as a case study,this paper analyzes the influence of government subsidies on the sales volume,sales price and profit of byd group's new energy vehicles,and verifies the model conclusion that government subsidies indeed increase the sales volume of new energy vehicles and the profit of enterprises.Finally,based on the above analysis,relevant policy Suggestions are put forward from the three aspects of government,enterprises and consumers.Consumers should enhance their awareness of environmental protection and improve their acceptance of new energy vehicles.Enterprises should actively participate in the new energy automobile industry,and establish supply chain partners,optimize supply chain management,so as to obtain more benefits;The government should strengthen the supervision and management of subsidies,prevent the phenomenon of "fraudulent subsidies",grasp the intensity of subsidies,and optimize the object and method of subsidies,so as to strengthen and strengthen the excellent,and put an end to the abuse of subsidies by enterprises.