Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Hazardous Chemicals Road Transportation Safety

Dangerous chemicals road transport safety involves multiple stakeholders including the government,logistics companies,cargo owners,social organizations,and the public.Government supervision is the basic guarantee for the safety of dangerous chemicals road transport,and logistics companies are the main body to complete the transportation safety process.The transportation needs of the cargo owner enterprise are the driving force for the continuous development of the logistics industry,but at the same time,the interests of different stakeholders are also different,and there are often conflicts of interest between each other,resulting in inefficient government safety supervision,Problems such as the inadequate implementation of the enterprise safety production responsibility system have caused many road transportation accidents of hazardous chemicals.Reducing the occurrence of transportation accidents requires multiple parties to work together to promote,so exploring the strategic choices between different stakeholders is of great significance to the safety impact of hazardous chemicals on road transportation.This article first conducts a case analysis of four recent road transportation accidents involving hazardous chemicals in China,summarizes the current problems of all parties involved,and then introduces stakeholder theory to try out stakeholders involved in the safety of road transportation of hazardous chemicals.Classified and defined,and specifically analyzed the interests of the main stakeholders,in order to better reflect the actual situation,considering the existence of competition between logistics companies and logistics companies and the principal-agent relationship between the two situations,based on evolution Based on the assumption of bounded rationality and asymmetric information,the game theory constructs a government security supervision evolution game model under the competition relationship and a logistics enterprise security transportation game model under the principal-agentrelationship,and establishes a game revenue payment matrix.On this basis,The copied dynamic equations are brought into the system dynamics Vensim software for numerical simulation analysis of the stability of the evolutionary game.Among them,the game model of government safety supervision evolution under the competition relationship mainly discusses the impact of different government punishment mechanisms on the safety of hazardous chemicals road transportation.It is found that under the static punishment mechanism,the government regulatory agencies and logistics companies have different degrees of strategic choices.Repeated wave dynamics,there is no evolutionary stability strategy,followed by the introduction of dynamic punishment mechanism,the strategy fluctuations of the game subject have been effectively suppressed.Compared with the static punishment mechanism,the dynamic punishment mechanism can better reduce the strategy choice of the game subject during the game.Risks caused by repeated fluctuations in the logistics;in the agency transportation model of the logistics enterprise under the principal-agent relationship,the impact of the game between the government,the logistics enterprise and the cargo owner enterprise on the safety of hazardous chemicals road transportation is discussed,and the cost of supervision is changed by changing external variables,Punishment measures,subsidy cost,basic transportation cost,safety input cost,transportation revenue,accident loss and other parameter value changes,observe the influence on the choice of strategy of the game main body,give a theoretical explanation of the simulation results,and give all parties involved in the game Subject proposed Targeted proposed measures.Because the road transportation safety of hazardous chemicals involves the joint participation of multiple stakeholders,the game process is complicated.This article builds a game analysis of the evolution of hazardous chemicals road transportation safety under two scenarios,enriches the theoretical research on the prevention of hazardous chemicals road transportation accidents,and focuses on the current government safety supervision,logistics enterprise safety management and cargo owner companies The problems faced in the selection of outsourcing propose some feasible measures and countermeasures,with a view to providing a certain reference and reference value for reducing the occurrence of hazardous chemical road transport accidents.