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Financing Strategy Of Risk Averse Suppliers

Posted on:2020-04-10Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:G P WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330620960425Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the rapid development of e-commerce and Internet,more and more enterprises have launched online direct marketing channels.In these two-channel supply chains,some small and medium-sized enterprises are facing capital constraints.How to finance them to help them run production is a very important thing.In the actual market environment,the supply chain members have different risk-bearing capacity,and the information asymmetry caused by the incomplete information will affect the financing choice.This article takes the "4S" distribution mode of car sales as well as the direct mode of automobile electricity supplier as an example.Based on CVaR criterion,the financing model of a single supplier and retailer with capital constraints,supplier opening direct marketing channels,and supplier cost information with private information is constructed.This article studies the optimal decisions of retail price,direct selling price and wholesale price under without capital constraint and the bank loan financing model with capital constraint and the retailer's prepayment financing model.Then the three models of information symmetry and information asymmetry are compared.And the influence of supplier and retailer's risk attitude on the optimal decision-making,the influence of asymmetric information on the optimal decision-making,and the influence of supplier's initial capital on the optimal financing choice are further elaborated by numerical analysis.Finally,we analyse how to achieve supply chain coordination through revenue sharing and transfer payment contracts,and study the impact of contract parameters on decision-making and profit allocation of supply chain membersFirstly,the influence of risk aversion degree of suppliers and retailers on their financing decisions is analyzed.The supplier's direct selling price increases with the supplier's risk aversion,the supplier's wholesale price increases with the supplier's risk aversion and decreases with the retailer's risk aversion.The retailer's retail price increases with the supplier's risk aversion and increases with the retailer's risk aversion.Next,the impact of information asymmetry on financing decision-making is analyzed.Under certain conditions,asymmetric information can bring some benefits to one side of the transaction by hiding information,but at the same time it will damage the interests of the other side and the interests of the whole supply chain.This problem can be solved by information sharing.Information sharing can not only improve market efficiency,but also increase supply chain efficiency by reducing information cost.Under different initial funds,the optimal financing methods are also different.Generally,when bank loans and retailers' advance payment financing models are feasible,suppliers will first choose the way of advance payment.However,in order to achieve win-win situation,suppliers need to give retailers a suitable price discount coefficient.Finally,the coordination of supply chain is analyzed.Regardless of whether the supplier is financially constrained,whether it is external financing or internal financing,the entire supply chain can be coordinated by designing a revenue sharing and transfer payment combination contract.The two contract parameters that realize supply chain coordination can be mutually converted,and the specific relationship should be determined through negotiation between the supplier and retailer.The sharing factor is related to the supplier's and retailer's profit ?...
Keywords/Search Tags:Capital Constraint, risk aversion, asymmetric information, bank loan, advance payment
PDF Full Text Request
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