The Henrich_Guyer Reproach And Kant's B-Deduction

The purpose of this article is to respond a typical censure to the a priori argument of Kant's B-Deduction,which is called as ‘Henrich-Guyer reproach' by me,through clarifying the general structure of B-Deduction,especially by extracting an underlying condition overlooked by traditional commentators,which is called as ‘the argument against intellectual intuition' in this article,I attempt to defend and validate the original process of the Deduction.This is not a reconstruction but merely an analysis to the original argument of B-Deduction,while through doing this,a different picture of Deduction is supposed to be seen in contrast with those orthodox interpretations,at the same time,many relevant blames to this strategy will collapse.In the first chapter,I elucidate the classical censure to B Deduction from scholars like Henrich and Guyer,i.e,in order to prove the objective validity of the ‘Categories' premised on a pure analytical proposition about ‘self-consciousness',B-Deduction made a fallacious transaction from the de dicto to the de re level.In the other two chapters,based on a general-accepted viewpoint in the field of Kant interpretation and a detailed analysis to text of B-Deduction,I attempt to refute the two basic theoretical presuppositions of ‘Henrich-Guyer reproach',on the one hand,I shall give a respond to this typical criticism,on the other hand,I shall present the possibility of drawing a different picture of the original Deduction.