The Effect Of Clan Network On Rural Public Goods Supply

The "three rural issues" occupies an important position in the economic and social development of our country.In particular,the effective supply of rural public goods is closely related to these issues,which increasing farmers' income,reducing poverty in rural areas,and reducing the gap between urban and rural areas.Since the reform and opening up,great changes have taken place in rural areas.On the one hand,infrastructure and public services have improved significantly,but there are still problems such as insufficient supply,structural imbalances,and supply-demand mismatches,which restrict rural development and the improvement of farmers' living standards.This is also an important reason for the urban-rural dual structure.On the other hand,rural governance mechanism has also changed.With the implementation of villager autonomy,the clans began to participate in democratic elections,seeking the coupling of informal and formal systems.In this context,as a clan that has historically been responsible for the supply of public goods in rural areas for a long time,the question of how to influence the supply of public goods in rural areas has become an important one at this stage.First of all,the article sorts out the relevant literature of public goods and clan,and combines the related theories of accountability and collective action,using clan networks as explanatory variables and rural public goods supply levels as explanatory variables,to construct the analytical framework of "clan network—accountability and collective action—rural public goods supply",and to propose related hypotheses.Afterwards,based on the data of the China National Health and Pension Tracking Survey(CHARLS),the article tested the research hypothesis by Ordered Probit model.On the one hand,the influence of clan structure on the supply level of rural public goods was studied from the two dimensions of quantity and concentration,and the results were tested for robustness.On the other hand,the role of the clans on the supply of rural public goods is explored.The results found that: first,based on the quantity level,the clan has a heterogeneous effect on the supply of rural public goods.Compared with no clan,two balanced clan structures can significantly improve the supply level of rural public goods,while a single large structure and multiple mixed structures are not significant.Second,based on the level of concentration,compared with no clan,the high oligopoly clan structure has a significant positive impact on the supply of public goods in the village,while the competitive and low oligopoly structures have not played a significant role.Moreover,after using differentmethods to test the above results,the results are still robust.Third,the number of clans influences the supply of rural public goods by influencing the will of the elected,and the degree of clan concentration affects the supply of rural public goods by affecting the ability of the elected.According to the above conclusions,in order to give full play to the clan's positive role in the supply of rural public goods,the following suggestions are put forward: first,face up to the role of the clans,continuously improve the laws and regulations to regulate the behavior of the clan,and appropriately guide and encourage the clans to assume part of supervision duties.Second,coordinate the distribution of interests among the clans,and build a benign organizational norm to restrict the behavior of villagers.Third,due attention should be paid to village heterogeneity in the redevelopment of villages.