Research On PPP Project Contract Re-negotiation Based On Jurisprudence Of Economic Analysis

In recent years,with the vigorous development of PPP projects,the abuse of the PPP model has emerged in an endless stream.Therefore,the Ministry of Finance and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission issued the No.92 and No.192 documents respectively,which made the PPP project enter a cooling-off period.Therefore,in the case of such a situation change,the legitimate rights and interests of the parties to the PPP project are out of balance,and the contractual rights of the unbalanced contract need to be restored through renegotiation.This paper studies the contract renegotiation of PPP projects from the perspective of economic analysis law.Because economic analysis law includes the pursuit of efficiency in economics and the pursuit of justice in law,the article mainly through renegotiation under efficiency and fairness.The contract is solved,and the renegotiation contract under the common constraint of fairness and efficiency is analyzed by analyzing the bias of the single-party contract solution.Firstly,the contract solution is obtained by kaldor-Hicks efficiency constraint.This chapter mainly uses the principal-agent theory to study the risk sharing between the government and the social capital in the process of renegotiation.By assuming the model of risk sharing between the government and the social capital,the risk sharing model in the case of incomplete information and the risk sharing model after introducing the risk sharing effort are respectively established.In each case,the risk sharing ratio of the government and the social capital side and the incentive utility share of the social capital side,and the model verification through parameter analysis and simulation analysis,to determine the maximum effectiveness of the renegotiation process and reach Caldochic The efficiency of the situation.Secondly,the contractual solution is obtained under the constraint of fairness.The principal-agent theory is also used.Based on the fair preference of social capital,the game model between government and social capital is constructed by improving the FS model.From the perspective of fairness,it analyzes the risk allocation strategy of the government and the risk response strategy of the social capital side,and constructs and solves the risk allocation method based on the FS model.Finally,through the analysis of the two kinds of coordinated contract solutions,the article uses the alternatives expressed by the two parties in reality to show the consistency of the two.By analyzing the main factors affecting fairness and efficiency,the paper seeks the equilibrium solution of the contract,and finally proposes the best way to realize the renegotiation under the combination of fairness and efficiency,and draws lessons for the future renegotiation process.