The Empirical Research On The Impact Of The Behavior Of Local Officials On Land Finance And Economic Growth

Since the reform and opening up,the Chinese economy has maintained steady and rapid growth.After the tax-sharing reform,"land finance"rose.On the one hand,"land finance"has indeed contributed to the promotion of local economic development and urban construction;on the other hand,"land finance"has also caused many problems in urban development.Some misbehaving officials use unscrupulous means to promote the growth of economic indicators,ignoring long-term effects.Therefore,an in-depth analysis of the impact of local officials'actions on land finance and economic growth has become critical.Based on the view of macro and micro,this paper combines theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to study the impact of local officials'corruption on land finance,economic growth,listed company operations,environment and people's livelihood expenditures.What effect will the anti-corruption actions of the Eighth National Congress have on these effects?This paper takes the"top party and government leader"data of prefecture-level and above cities from 2000 to 2016 as the research object.Firstly,the OLS regression model is used to analyze the impact of corrupt officials on local land finance.The results show that compared with non-corrupt officials,corrupt officials have higher land transfer area growth when they serve,and the land transfer income growth is not obvious,that is,there may be The phenomenon of selling land at a low price.Driven by land finance,corrupt officials promoted local economic growth in the short term,but hindered local economic growth in the long run.And for local listed companies,the short-term growth at the macro level is not reflected in the level of listed companies,In addition,this article examines in depth the relationship between corrupt officials and the growth in fiscal expenditures for public services.The results show that there is no significant difference in the growth of public service fiscal expenditure,indicating that the short-term economic growth and fiscal revenue growth brought by land finance has not actually been implemented into the interests of the people.This kind of economic growth by fulfilling the potential of future development is more inclined to be a performance project.After the 18th National Congress,the correlation between corrupt officials and the growth of land transfer and economic growth disappeared,indicating that the anti-corruption actions of the 18th National Congress have affected the behavior patterns of corrupt officials and corrected the short-sighted behavior of officials.This paper conducts an empirical study of the relationship between local officials'behavior and land finance and economic growth,confirming that corrupt officials have a stronger incentive to use more radical land transfers to stimulate short-term economic growth,and this growth is not for people's livelihood.The service produced a more significant improvement.The anti-corruption action after the 18th National Congress has corrected the distortion phenomenon to a certain extent.The conclusions of this paper can help us better understand the governance of corrupt officials when they serve in the local area,and provide reference ideas for the corresponding policies.