Research On Disclosure Willingness Of Insurance Agent To Fraudulent Claims

Insurance agents are the bridge between insurance companies and insurance customers and play an important role in the insurance market.Based on the principal-agent relationship,on the one hand,the insurance agent selects customers for the insurance company,expands the market,sells insurance products,and receives corresponding compensation accordingly.On the other hand,the insurance agent's duties also involve the claims section.In the event of insurance losses,the insurance agent will accept the insurance customer's claim,screen it,and assist the insurance company to make claims based on the insurance contract.However,due to the information asymmetry that cannot be avoided in the principal-agent relationship,insurance agents always have moral hazard problems.Affected by this,the insurance agent will show a conflict of interest with the insurance company under certain conditions.This paper focuses on the behavior choice and decision-making mechanism of insurance agents in the face of insurance fraud.As the instinct of the insurance industry,insurance fraud erodes the profits of insurance companies and damages the rights and interests of honest policyholders.It is a serious unethical behavior(or even constitutes a crime).What kind of behavior will an insurance agent take in the face of a fraud claim from a customer? What is the basis for its decision? In order to answer this question,the paper uses the social exchange theory,principal-agent theory and prospect theory to analyze the strategic choices of insurance agents for fraud claims(disclosure willingness)and explore the corresponding decisionmaking mechanism.The paper uses MBA students and the public as sample,the three main progressive experiments to verify the main effect of customer value,the mediator effect of hidden return expectation on the insurance agent's willingness to disclose under the fraud claim scenario,and the moderate effect of reciprocal belief and disclose rewards in the above relationship.The experimental results show that in the face of fraud claims from customers,the insurance agent's willingness to disclose is significantly affected by the value of the customer.Compared with low-value customers,the insurance agent has a lower willingness to disclose the fraudulent practice of high-value customers.Furthermore,because the customer value determines the profit return of the agent to a certain extent,the hidden return expectation provides a clear intermediary explanation for the internal mechanism of customer valuediscovery willingness,at the same time,this relationship is more significant in agents with high reciprocity beliefs.In the case of insurance fraud,the moderate effect of reciprocal beliefs explains the important fact that the return of interest depends on the objective assessment or subjective expectation of the insurance agent's interaction and feedback on the interests of itself and the client.The more optimistic the evaluation or prediction of this feedback relationship,the more favorable the agent is to perceive a more substantial hidden return expectation.On the other hand,the disclosure of rewards does not have a significant regulatory effect on the above relationship;but as an incentive,high disclosure awards can significantly increase the insurance agent's willingness to disclose high-value customer fraud claims.The paper verifies the behavior decision hypothesis of insurance agents under the fraud claim scenario,reveals the moral hazard performance of the agent under the asymmetric information of the insurance market,and the corresponding constraints and incentive mechanisms.The relevant conclusions have important management implications,and can provide a basis to prevent insurance fraud and optimize the relationship between insurance companies and insurance agents.