Research On Bidding Agency Enterprises Participating In Army General Materials Purchasing Based On Principal-agent Theory

The entrusted agency cooperation between the bidding agency and the army has promoted the army to obtain more effective information on the material procurement market.The bidding agency has also opened up a new market.The relationship between the military and the bidding agency has also continued in cooperation.strengthen.However,with the increase in the number of agents commissioned by both parties,there have also been some post-moral moral hazard behaviors,such as rent-seeking between bidding agency companies and material suppliers,which seriously jeopardized the order of the military procurement market,leading to a reduction in the efficiency of material procurement and affecting the military.Daily supply and demand.Therefore,in order to reduce the possibility of the rent-seeking behavior of the bidding agency during the procurement of agency materials,based on the psychological perspective of reciprocity preference,this article analyzes how to achieve a stable situation that benefits the army from the perspective of supervision and incentive mechanisms and evolutionary games.The thesis first introduces the specific content of principal-agent theory,evolutionary game theory,reciprocity model,and rent-seeking behavior,and provides a reliable theoretical basis for subsequent chapter research.By analyzing the current situation of the procurement of agency materials by the bidding agency,the main body of the army’s material procurement,the agency contract and the procurement process are clarified.The game analysis shows that when the army chooses the mode in which the final bid company pays the agency service fee,the inevitability of the bid-seeking agent’s rent-seeking behavior occurs,providing a reliable basis for the subsequent empirical part.Based on the principal-agent relationship between the army and the bidding agency,when the army uses linear incentives(consisting of a fixed percentage of the bid price paid by the winning bidder and the army’s incentive compensation),build a principal-agent incentive for the military bidding agency Model,using evolutionary games to analyze the selection of stable strategies for the military and bidding agency under the two modes of linear incentives and fixed returns.Then,the friendly function was introduced,and an evolutionary game model between the army and the bidding agency was constructed from the perspective of reciprocity preferences.The strategic choices of the two sides were analyzed from a dynamic perspective.The analysis showed that after evolution,the two parties reached a certain degree of supervision and reciprocity preferences.In the case of a level,the system will eventually form a stable situation where the bidding agency does not seek rent.Using MATLAB to make a simulation analysis of the factors that affect the bidding agency’s strategy selection,and obtain the influence mechanism of each influencing factor;subsequently,based on the preference of reciprocity,the simulation analysis of the dynamic selection process of the two parties’ mixed strategies is performed.The results show that for reciprocity Bidding agency companies with strong preferences can take full advantage of their reciprocity preferences and weaken supervision;for companies with weaker reciprocity preferences,they need to increase supervision to prevent them from seeking unfavorable military and other bidders.