Analysis On The Control Right Of The Founder Of A Company

As the founder of the company,the founder of the foreign financing will inevitably bring share dilution,dilution means in the shareholders' voting rights are weakened,the founder of the company is unable to continue at the beginning of the implementation in the establishment of the company set for the company's strategy,the company may lose cannot keep control of the company founder and half way there.Under the framework of corporate governance system in China and even in the world,although the board of directors has the right of management,the shareholders'meeting is often controlled by the board of directors.However,this does not mean that the power center of the company has changed from the board of directors to the board of directors.Taking the board of shareholders as the power center is still the legislative purpose of modern company law,and the board of shareholders still occupies the highest position of the power of the company.Therefore,for the company founder,the ultimate path to control the company is to obtain the majority voting rights of the shareholders' meeting.Article on the current domestic founders control keep path cross shareholding,preferred stock,consistent,voting rights,voting rights agent control keep the advantage and the analysis of existing reality,and finally points out that in China the current strict adherence to a system framework,a founder of control with the company's external financing the contradictory existence.The above path does not allow the company founder to have sustainable and stable corporate control.,therefore,it is necessary for us to jump out of the right,with shares with right to institutional framework,the introduction of British and American national double ownership structure,the lack of funds and founder of stock is not enough basis to maintain control of the path,to make up for the current company law within the framework of control of the company founder maintain the drawback of the path.The core part of this paper is to discuss the advantages of dual-class share structure system in maintaining the stability of founder's control rights.Dual-class share structure has a good mechanism to prevent hostile takeover invasion,and well realizes the optimal allocation of corporate voting rights,so that shareholders who really care about corporate affairs can obtain the majority of voting rights.Everything has two sides,dual class share structure also has some disadvantages,but as long as there is a perfect system and its supporting,the dual class share structure can be introduced into the right track.The last part of this paper analyzes the feasibility and necessity of introducing the dual-class share structure in China,and points out that to introduce the dual-class share structure in China,it is necessary to have corresponding institutional mechanism to ensure its smooth operation,and discusses this part of the mechanism to a certain extent.