Industrial Land Transfer Intervention And Official Promotion

Since the reform and opening up,the macro economy of China has keep a great growth for forty years,which is known as "the China miracle." However,with the rapid development of the economy,issues such as environmental protection,education and public livelihood have become increasingly prominent.In recent years,the central government has proposed to "transform the mode of economic development".The government should pay more attention to the long-term stable operation of the economy rather than the rapid increase of the total economic volume in the short term.In the past few decades,China has established a rigorous performance evaluation mechanism from the central to the local The quality of political performance largely determines the promotion results of local leaders.Under the new development background,the higher-level government's performance appraisal of local leaders has also changed from the traditional "only GDP is hero" to the "multi-dimensional and multi-standard" comprehensive assessment.With the environmental protection,public livelihood and other factors have been gradually considered into the performance appraisal system of local leaders,and even exert the influence of “one-vote veto”,it is difficult for the promotion competition between local leaders to have the characteristics of “race to bottom”.Among the basic production factors of economic development,land is a kind of “scarce” economic resource.As early as the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee,the Central Committee has clearly stated that it is necessary to promote "the reform of the economic system that closely plays a decisive role in the allocation of resources in the market." Therefore,promoting market-oriented reform of land supply should be the proper meaning of “deepening reform and opening up”,but relevant data shows that while the central government has spared no effort to promote the market-oriented reform of land elements,local governments are keen to use the listing method to sell industrial land.Studies have shown that local governments are more likely to influence the pre-conditions,implementation process and transfer results of land transfer in the process of listing.Based on the relevant literatures,this paper selects the industrial land intervention indicators based on listing,and the panel data of 70 large and medium-sized cities from 2008 to 2016 to verify that the industrial land transfer intervention can improve the promotion probability of local leaders.After that,this paper constructs the mediation effect model to further verify that the incomplete mediation factor of industrial land transfer intervention to increase the probability of promotion is economic growth;although the implicit performance indicators such as environmental protection and labor protection have been truly included in the performance appraisal of local leaders,the promotion competition between local leaders is also difficult to evolve into “race to bottom”.However,in all the performance evaluation standards of local leaders,economic growth is still a concentrated expression of the governing ability of officials,and it is easier to be quantified than other indicators.As a result,the “economic growth” type of political competition between local leaders will not end,and the roots of “intervention competition” around local governments will still exist.Finally,unlike most of the literatures,this paper argues that the agreement has already been legally applicable,so it cannot be used as a tool for local governments to intervene in land transfer.In contrast,both auction and agreement transfer the listing of features is more likely to become a tool for local governments to intervene in land transfer.The conclusions of this paper indicate that the central government is constantly advancing the market-oriented reform of land factor,while it continues the assessment of the performance of local governments based on economic performance.Then,in the face of strict performance appraisal,local leaders have adopted the method of increasing the intensity of intervention in land transfer to seek political capital for themselves,which seriously hindered the market-oriented reform process of land factor.From the transfer of the agreement to the listing,the local government's intervention in the land market has been repeatedly forbidden.The root of the problem may be that the central and local governments have "dislocation of interests." Therefore,clarifying the deep logic behind land transfer intervention not only helps to fully understand the local government's act of land intervention,but also helps to promote the market-oriented reform of land factor.