| Since the reform and opening-up,the miracle of China’s economic growth has attracted the attention of many scholars at home and abroad,and the role of the land element has been particularly remarkable.A large number of scholars have focused on the land leasing behavior of local governments,explored the motives and effects of land transfer by local governments,and tried to explain the internal connection between land leasing and economic growth.Some of these scholars noticed that the promotion incentives of the governing officials are related to the local government’s industrial land leasing behavior,but the impact and the mechanism have not been able to reach a consistent conclusion.These studies are mostly based on an implicit assumption that local officials completely represent the local government,and the promotion incentives received by officials are directly transmitted to the government as a whole and make it respond accordingly.In fact,there are differences in goals and utility between the governing officials and the local government as a whole.Only by revealing how promotion incentives are passed from officials to government departments can it be more accurately portrayed that officials’ promotion incentives affect local governments.The influence of the government’s land leasing behavior.Therefore,the question this article wants to explore is: What impact does the promotion of officials have on the leasing of industrial land by local governments? In what ways does the personal political promotion incentives of local officials drive the local government’s decision-making on the transfer of industrial land? Is the economic growth target one of the important transmission mechanisms? Answering the above questions will help to clarify the relationship between the promotion of officials and the leasing of industrial land by local governments,promote the intensive and economical use of industrial land,provide theoretical support for the market-oriented allocation of land elements,and correctly understand the role of economic growth targets.The high-quality development of my country’s economy.This paper firstly defines the related concepts involved,through combing the local government’s land leasing motives and the literature on the local government’s industrial land leasing,and sums up the motivations of the promotion of local officials influencing the industrial land leasing.Then,through combing the related literature on promotion incentives and government performance goal setting,economic growth goals and land transfer,try to cut into the economic growth goals,and reveal how the promotion incentives received by the officials in charge are transformed into the overall economic growth goals of the local government.Which in turn affects the industrial land leasing behavior of relevant departments of local government,constructs the theoretical framework of this article,and proposes the research hypothesis of this article.Then,during the study period,the status quo of my country’s industrial land leasing and the facts of setting economic growth targets at the national,provincial,and municipal levels are analyzed,and descriptive statistical analysis is performed on the tenure and individual characteristics of prefectural city officials.Preliminary verification of the hypothesis of this article.After that,using panel data from 266 prefecture-level cities across the country from 2007 to 2016,we will empirically examine the impact of official tenure and individual characteristics on the scale of industrial land leasing,focusing on the intermediary role played by economic growth targets,and further discuss the age of officials and the party The influence of the heterogeneity of the official tenure produced by the political cycle of the Congress on the scale of industrial land leasing.Based on the theoretical analysis of this article and empirical tests,this article draws the following research conclusions:(1)The promotion incentives received by local government officials have an important impact on the leasing of industrial land,and there is a significant difference between the term of the municipal party committee secretary and the area of industrial land transferred by the local government.The highest point of the inverted U-shaped relationship occurs in the third year of his tenure,and the measurement result between the mayor’s tenure and the area of industrial land leased by the local government is not significant;(2)the heterogeneity of the tenure of the municipal party committee secretary The inspection found that,first,the inverted U-shaped impact of the tenure of the municipal party committee secretary over 57 years old on the area of industrial land leasing is no longer significant.Second,by investigating the political cycle effect caused by the convening of the party congress,it is found that the convening of the provincial party congress has further strengthened the inverted U-shaped relationship between the tenure of officials and the area of industrial land leasing.(3)Official promotion incentives influence the formulation of local government economic growth targets,transform individual officials’ promotion incentives into overall government economic growth targets,and decompose the target accountability system to promote industrial land leasing by local governments.The economic growth target played an intermediary role in the impact of the municipal party committee secretary’s term on the area of industrial land leased by the local government. |
