Risk Investment In The Principal-agent And Its Institutionalization

In the process of venture investment operation, existence of risk investment organization between the investor and the venture enterprise brings two principal-agent relationship .One is between the investor and the venture investment organization; another is between the venture investment organization and the venture enterprise. So, the agent-chain is increased by contrast with direct investment of the investor, and with the information asymmetry, the principal-agent problems, adverse selection and moral hazard come out. In order to settle these problems, some system arrangements are needed to alleviate information asymmetry.Beginning with the operation characteristic of the venture investment, this paper deeply analyzed the principal-agent problems of the two-layer agent relationship with criterion methods under the information asymmetry condition. All the analysis is guided by the basic theory of information economics. After that, a suit of effective prompting and restricting mechanism is worked out to alleviate the extent of information asymmetry, which can resolve principal-agent problems, reduce the principal-agent hazard and improve the operating efficiency of risk investment. Finally, connected with the practice instance of the venture investment development in current stage in our country, some suggestions are given to develop and perfect the microcosmic working mechanism from the side of the principal-agent relationship.