Research On The Legal Regulation On Data-driven Concentration Of Undertakings

In the era of digital economy,big data,as an important production resource,has a profound impact on people's production and life.Under the data-driven business model,big data brings huge economic benefits to operators.In reality,more and more operators choose to use centralized strategies to obtain more large-scale,high-quality data,obtain data advantages,and enhance their own.Market power.The concentration of data-driven operators is becoming more and more common,but based on the data scale effect,user lock-in effect,free model and other characteristics of the big data market,as well as the existence of defensive concentration and the reduction of privacy protection,existing operators have centralized regulations The theory seems weak.Therefore,this article tries to combine the characteristics of big data,analyze the deficiencies of the existing centralized legal regulations of operators,and explore the improvement suggestions for the centralized legal regulations of operators in the era of big data.First of all,this article starts from the basic theory of data-driven operators focusing on legal regulation,first defines big data,and analyzes the characteristics of data scale effect,locking effect,dynamic competition and other characteristics existing in the big data market;and then drives data Define the concentration behaviors of large-scale operators,and analyze the phenomenon of defensive concentration and the reduction of privacy protection after concentration in the context of big data.Finally,the regulatory concepts and review framework of the concentration of data-driven operators are studied,and the Monopoly regulations should follow consumer welfare value goals,focus on analyzing dynamic efficiency,and give more attention to non-price factors such as quality and innovation.Secondly,according to the current situation of the legal regulation of operator concentration,the module discusses the difficulties of centralized regulation of data-driven operators.In terms of market definition,the bilateral market,the free model,and cross-border competition frustrate the traditional market definition method;the existing operator concentration declaration standard is single,and it is impossible to capture the concentration of the turnover standard that cannot be achieved under the special profit model;There are identified difficulties in weakening the role of traditional market share,enhancing market barriers to data scale effects,and increasing changes in the market structure of dynamic competition;in the evaluation of anti-competitive effects,it is more difficult to consider non-price factors,and it is difficult to analyze big data and privacy protection issues;Regarding the collection of relief measures,due to the impact of dynamic competition,the design and supervision of relief measures become more difficult.Once again,it summarizes the experience of foreign countries in concentrating on the legal regulation of data-driven operators.It mainly studies typical cases in the European Union,antitrust practices in the United States,legislative amendments to the digital economy in Germany,and official reports from Japan.The actual situation analyzes the enlightenment obtained from it and lays the foundation for a series of perfect suggestions.Finally,combined with the experience of anti-monopoly regulations outside the region,some exploratory suggestions are put forward.Regarding the definition of the relevant market,the traditional definition method can be adjusted accordingly,for example,the SSNDQ or SSNIC method can be adapted.The definition of the regional market should combine the characteristics of the product and the sales model,consumer habits,relevant policies,etc.The impact of innovation on the market should be considered,and the dynamics of the digital economy should be considered;the centralized declaration of operators can be considered for the inclusion of transaction volume standards,and the threshold of transaction volume standards should be carefully determined;Consideration of power,user transfer barriers,and enterprise innovation capabilities;when evaluating the concentration of anti-competitive effects,attention should be paid to non-price factors,and the company 's data power and privacy protection should be included in the consideration of competitive effects;Combined with the characteristics of dynamic competition,more consideration should be given to the selection of behavioral remedies.