Research On The External Factors Of Official Rent-Seeking In China's Public Service Outsourcing

China's public service outsourcing was initiated in the 1990 s.After nearly 30 years of development,the public service outsourcing system has become more and more mature and perfect,and has increasingly become an important tool for the Chinese government to carry out public service reform and improve the quality of public service supply to enhance the sense of gain,happiness and security.However,when public service outsourcing introduces market forces into the field of public service supply,it also provides conditions for power to intervene in the market.In recent years,the rent-seeking activities of officials frequently occur in public service outsourcing in China,which seriously wastes social resources,reduces the quality of outsourcing and damages the image of the government.However,the rent-seeking of officials in public service outsourcing is not only due to the subjective interest of officials,but also due to the existence of various objective factors in outsourcing,which make the rent-seeking can,rent-seeking conditions and rent-seeking dare of officials.Therefore,it is of great significance to identify and eliminate the elements of rent-seeking in public service outsourcing so as to solve the rent-seeking problem and realize the healthy and long-term development of the public service outsourcing system.This study is based on rent-seeking theory,principal-agent theory and public choice theory and the value judgment of this paper is put forward under the guidance of previous literature analysis and theory:in public service outsourcing,there are power factors,information factors and risk factors that constitute officials' rent-seeking.Rent-seeking power factor refers to as a result of the unbalance of power structure in the public service outsourcing,outsourcing officials with centralized decision-making and approval,due to the subjective fickle kinds of power and lack of power restriction of objective,power alienation becomes a self-seeking tool,provides the result of the power can be as the premise;Information factor refers to the inevitable information asymmetry between the government and social organizations,the government and the public,and social organizations and the public in the principal-agent process of public service outsourcing.Such information resources will provide the capital conditions and concealment conditions for officials to obtain rent.Even under the condition of information advantages,the individual rent-seeking of officials will turn into the collectivized rent-seeking of departments.Risk factor refers to that in public service outsourcing,due to the lack of system,officials' rent-seeking is found to be of low risk,the punishment is weak after being found,and under the incentive of high rent of outsourcing projects,such rentseeking guarantee of “low risk and high yield” finally catalyzes the bold result of officials' rent-seeking.Finally,after combining the typical cases of official rent-seeking in public service outsourcing,this paper proposes countermeasures to avoid the power,information and risk factors of rent-seeking in order to solve the problem of official rent-seeking in public service outsourcing and achieve the healthy development of public service outsourcing.