Research On The Reward Distribution Of Police Cooperation In Grassroots Public Security Organs

The report of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China made a strategic plan for the implementation of regional coordinated development in response to the changes of the new era,further optimized China's spatial structure and expanded the space for regional development.In the context of the new pattern of regional coordinated development,China's crime problem also presents a new situation of mobility and cross regional.It is imperative for the public security organs to carry out regional police cooperation,improve the function of regional security and public service,and further improve the ability of regional security governance.However,due to the local management and free cooperation of the public security organs,there are many problems in the actual implementation of regional police cooperation,such as insufficient execution,unsmooth cooperation process and insufficient cooperation depth.Aiming at these problems,based on the classical game models of "prisoner's dilemma","pig's game" and "deer hunting game",this paper analyzes the factors and mechanism that affect the regional police cooperation,establishes the evolutionary game models of Regional Police Cooperation under unconstrained and constrained conditions respectively,and obtains the solutions according to the evolutionary game results,and uses MATLAB The software is used to simulate and verify the evolution results.Finally,on the basis of evolutionary game and simulation results,the paper puts forward policy recommendations to optimize regional police cooperation.Specifically,the first chapter is the introduction,which describes the research background,research significance,research content,research methods and research status at home and abroad.The second chapter introduces the connotation,related concepts and game elements of regional police cooperation,and explains the feasibility of using game theory to analyze regional police cooperation.The third chapter analyzes the problems of cooperation obstacles in the process of regional police cooperation through the classic model of game theory.The fourth chapter constructs the evolutionary game model of regional police cooperation,analyzes the influence of cooperation cost,additional income,risk coefficient and other factors on the evolutionary game behavior,and simulates and tests the game results by MATLAB software.In the fifth chapter,the evolution game of regional police cooperation is optimized,and the influence of reward and punishment conditions and reputation conditions on the process of regional police cooperation game is discussed and analyzed.The result of game is simulated and tested by MATLAB software.The sixth chapter is based on the evolutionary game and simulation results,combined with the current situation of regional police cooperation in China,put forward relevant policy recommendations.The seventh chapter summarizes the researchprocess,points out the shortcomings of the research process,and looks forward to the research ideas and prospects of regional police cooperation strategy.